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Near East/South Asia Report



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TURKISH PRESS DEMANDS REEXAMINATION OF RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Unveiling of Monument

Paris LE MONDE in French 2 May 84 p 28

[Text] The sixty-ninth anniversary of the Armenian genocide was notably marked in France by a mass celebrated on Sunday 29 April at Notre-Dame in Paris according to the Armenian rite. Msgr Daniel Pezeril, auxiliary bishop of Paris representing Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger, recalled in his homily the "odious massacre" aimed at exterminating Armenians because they were Christians. For his part, Mr Joseph Franceschi, secretary of state for public safety, unveiled a monument in memory of the genocide of 1915 in Alforville (Val-de-Marne), where he is major. Mr Franceschi stated that "government action and its own fight would be pursued within international authorities to make people recognize the terror of the 1915 massacres," committed "by the Ottoman Empire." The catholicos (spiritual leader) of all Armenians and supreme patriarch Vasken I attended this unveiling.

The Turkish authorities reacted by criticizing these ceremonies and strongly condemned the attack committed on Saturday in Tehran against a Turkish national shortly before the arrival of their prime minister for a four-day official visit. The Armenian organization Asala has claimed credit for that attack.

Ankara Protests

Paris LE MONDE in French 2 May 84 p 28

[Article by Artun Unsal]

[Text] The unveiling of a new monument at Alforville, after the one in Marseilles, in memory of the Armenians killed in 1915 was very badly received by Turkish public opinion. The press is denouncing the role of Armenian religious in the orchestration of the anti-Turkish campaign abroad, by publishing, most notably, photos of a demonstration in Athens in which Armenian priests in their robes appear at the head of the procession.

In a communique issued on Saturday 28 April, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphatically criticized the unveiling of this "monument of hatred" by Mr Joseph Franceschi. Turkey has lodged a protest with French authorities. It accuses France of pursuing "a policy of leniency" toward international terrorism--in this case, toward Armenian terrorism--, and indicates that France's "bitter experiences" have clearly demonstrated that one cannot combat the scourge of terrorism using the expedient of "concessions and shady transactions."

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reproaches France for encouraging terrorist activities by "supporting the intentional efforts of groups flaunting their sympathy toward the justifications of the terrorist organizations and working to that end (...)." The communique concludes that the unveiling of the Armenian monument by the secretary of state, whose job it is to fight terrorism, as well as the participation of a religious official were deeply resented.

Turkey recalled its ambassador to Paris in 1973, after the unveiling of an Armenian monument in Marseilles. The newly-named ambassador, Mr Erez, was to be assassinated by Armenian terrorists in the middle of the street in Paris in 1975. The Turkish press today is asking that Turkey "reexamine its relations with France."

9895

CSO: 4619/50

PRIME MINISTER MOHAMED MZALI ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, MAGHREB

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 22 Apr 84 pp 6-7

[Interview with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali by Abdelwaheb Abdallah; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Every time Tunisia goes through a difficult period, voices are raised calling for the "urgent" adoption of a new strategy in the economic, political, and social field. What do you think about this?

[Answer] One does not change strategies unless a policy fails. And that is obviously not the case here.

When President Bourguiba, who determines the basic options in the area of domestic and foreign policy, appointed me prime minister in April 1980, I undertook to base my actions on an objective and thorough analysis of the situation in our country, particularly that following the events of 1978 and 1980.

Since that time, and in light of the lessons of the past, the government has buckled down to work and committed itself to implementing an economic and social policy characterized by the spirit of reform and a humanization of methods. We have made the effort to tackle the present and prepare for the future of Tunisia without yielding to the tendency to take a day-to-day approach (as is done elsewhere) to the various aspects of development or to deal with them in a sectoral or compartmentalized manner. We have adopted an overall, multidimensional view of development, and to carry out that development, we have perfected homogeneous methods which avoid contradictions and injustices to the maximum extent possible.

It is obvious that the problems which persist have not been covered up at all. The lessons of the past have enabled us to reach a synthesis of the country's needs, the people's requirements, the nation's aspirations, and the means available to the government. The question of regional balance, which is so essential, has been the object of special attention, and in the light of the analyses undertaken, we have implemented the first programs.

When speaking of regional balance, one naturally thinks of the completion of new infrastructures, industrial decentralization, measures against the rural exodus, and the development of agriculture. Especially over the past 4 years,

political measures have been steadily turning those objectives into realities. Besides the numerous legal texts, I would like to recall the establishment of such organizations as APIA and FONAPRA, which promote investment and actions to further the agricultural sector in areas in the Northwest, Center-South, and South. In addition to the jobs they create, those development poles are destined precisely to achieve balance among our regions, keep more citizens on the land, and reduce migration to the cities as much as possible.

That effort is continuing, and effective progress is being made. It will be a few years, however, before the results are fully perceived. The reason, of course, is that a policy which does not seek a facade of success but attacks the nation's real problems must not expect rapid or spectacular results. Being aware of the difficulties, we are going to continue implementing this policy, all the more since our current 5-year development plan was drawn up on the basis of national and especially regional consultation in which all men of good will throughout the territory of the republic participated.

It will be realized, therefore, that nothing can alter the chief options in the plan. The deficits in the General Equalization Fund are leading us simply to revise some of the detail and to reexamine the prices of certain "nonsocial" products. On the other hand, tactics could be adjusted. We must further refine the conditions for putting the message across so that public opinion as a whole will be more aware--more informed concerning the means and methods being used--and so that it will understand the value and scope of the therapy chosen for resolving certain economic difficulties.

As a result, we are determined to continue our action on the path of social dialogue and to take up the challenge: that of being able to achieve harmonious and balanced development while constantly reconciling the process of democratization and social justice with the safeguarding of public freedoms.

Lastly, since it is certain that there is no standard formula or miracle solution for quickly transforming reality and removing evils, we can rely only on unrelenting work, the spirit of reform that inspires us, and the will to do better. By that means, we will succeed in improving the lot of our least privileged citizens. Because that is the essential thing! And a jolt like that which occurred in January 1984, while it calls us back to our duty to be vigilant, must in no way divert us from that essential mission--that sacred mission--of struggling against all of underdevelopment's persistent features.

[Question] You have just presided over the 28th anniversary of the Tunisianizing of the National Security Police. The Ministry of Interior was frequently mentioned during the recent incidents in which it played more or less a leading role. How do you intend to restore efficiency to that department and bring it back to its true mission?

[Answer] First of all, it is essential that the Tunisian people regain complete confidence in those responsible for protecting their safety and property, defending the nation's achievements, and watching over state security.

Next, it is equally important that the police forces, which must distinguish themselves by their sense of discipline, devotion to the national community, public spiritedness, and respect for the dignity of the citizen, stay out of personal intrigues and the game of "politicking."

I remind you that on instructions from the chief of state, President Habib Bourguiba, the administrative organization of the security services has just been rationalized. The scattered services and the dilution of responsibility have been eliminated. Everything that is done now is transparent.

From now on, with the dynamization of this sector and the elimination of methods of action incompatible with coherence, the hierarchic spirit, and indispensable coordination, we will see to it that everyone, at all times and in all places, observes this golden rule: issue clearly expressed instructions on the one hand, and, on the other, carry out orders and instructions completely.

Over the past few weeks, the citizens have seen the progress made toward guaranteeing safety and enforcing the law strictly, because democracy blossoms and develops only in a society of law and justice.

Moreover, the establishment of three governorates (Capital, Ariana, and Ben Arous) in the Tunis District was decided on as a means of solving the problems more effectively and promptly and moving even closer to the citizen. We are working unceasingly to guarantee safety at all times inside the peripheral towns and Tunis itself. This has sometimes resulted in selective operations aimed at neutralizing certain delinquents and former convicts.

We must attack the source of the evil rather than simply combating its effects. For instance, the "counterexodus" policy aimed at relieving the overcrowding of the capital will be strengthened. We will continue to be extremely vigilant against anarchic construction. We must also continue the redevelopment of peripheral neighborhoods and, above all, see to it that they are provided with healthy and proper living conditions as well as with athletic fields and socio-cultural facilities.

I could no doubt continue reviewing what we have done so far and what we intend to do. But we must never forget the financial aspect of the problem. Besides the patience required while construction is being completed and equipment is being installed (patience which young people--whom we have brought up to be demanding--can hardly bear!), money is also needed--lots of money.

It is clear that beyond identifying the problems and formulating the appropriate solutions, the real difficulty lies in finding the funds with which to do all this, not in the political will to do it.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, how do you assess relations between the government and the union?

[Answer] I have not hesitated to pay tribute to the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] and its chairman for the patriotic and responsible attitude they have consistently maintained despite the occasional misunderstandings that

have arisen. Mutual trust has made it possible to iron out the obstacles and difficulties because we stand together in support of ensuring the social peace our country needs. On behalf of the government, I will continue, in the same spirit of dialogue and with the same sincerity, to work with the UGTT and all national organizations. Besides, there will never be too many of us struggling together to combat underdevelopment. The fate of our country is not solely in the hands of the government: it is also the responsibility of all the partners. During severe trials, great nations are able to preserve what is essential and to set aside what is only the froth of the moment. Great patriots also know how to rise to their responsibilities when the future of their country is at stake.

It is certain that the UGTT contains some great patriots and that we will find them sticking by us in our will to be a great nation--an invulnerable nation.

[Question] Is it not true that the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] must think about working methods adapted to the present and the future? As secretary general of the PSD, what do you think about this?

[Answer] The PSD is a living organism, and like all living organisms, it must evolve and improve its methods of action. That is the sine qua non condition for its survival. The party was that admirable machine which, under the leadership of its chief, the supreme fighter, fought colonialism and won. Since independence, it has amply contributed to the building of the state and the establishment of a national economy. It has certainly experienced crises. But it has been able in every instance to learn the necessary lessons and get its breath back with increased dynamism and intensity while constantly remaining close to the aspirations of the people. Despite the test of being in power and the passing of time, it remains a party with no equal and one bearing unsuspected potentialities within itself. Other political parties have been eroded by the exercise of power within just a few years: to realize this, all one has to do is look around (even at the Western countries!). It is part of the game, however, for our adversaries to attack the PSD and try to demoralize our members. Beyond the polemics and beyond the recent incidents, I admit that it should be a constant rule within the PSD to look for means and methods capable of dynamizing our party, explaining the government's policy, mobilizing members, creating a more solid tie between generations, and speaking the language of the people better.

It is excessive, however, if not unjust, to multiply one's complaints against the PSD and to proceed by discussing the situation in generalities. Attention must be paid to facts and realities.

1. First of all, I don't know of any political party throughout history that has been able to do much to make up for a faltering police force and oppose acts of violence.
2. But above all, the reprehensible behavior of a minority must not in any way make us forget the exemplary attitude of the great majority of party militants. In some instances, the latter have braved the perils and successfully defended the people's achievements. In others, they have opposed the words of command

issued by manipulators. And everywhere, true Destourians have remained faithful to the example set by the head of the party, President Bourguiba. They are not to blame for the machination that spread confusion in the police force while letting the criminals and agitators go free.

[Question] A fringe element consisting mainly of young people does not seem to be always adequately reached or "penetrated" by the political message. What conclusions do you draw from that irrefutable fact, and how do you think you can remedy the situation?

[Answer] For my part, I quickly realized that a fringe element in the population was still not being reached by either the parties or the national organizations. And since that is the case, they also do not benefit from adequate political guidance. Most of that fringe is made up of young people born after 1956 and even after 1961. For my part, I have always been sensitive to the problem, without, however, any touch of "paternalism." I have constantly acted to have young people guided and made to feel secure. Young people constitute a nation's potential wealth and the insurance that a country will be present for its rendez-vous with the future. I would also like to remind you that the first high-level mission assigned to me by President Bourguiba in independent Tunisia was concerned precisely with young people and their future.

It was on the basis of that experience and the teachings of the president that the watchword I issued was "the reconciliation of young people with society." But it goes without saying that reality is not going to be transformed immediately just because the prime minister mentions a problem or issues directives.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the lack of funds compels us to make choices among the priorities and to carry out our projects by stages. This means, for example, that because of the time required by big projects and a degree of sluggishness in the economic machinery (not to mention the effects of the worldwide economic crisis!), the basic problem of the creation of jobs for young people can only be partially solved. But these circumstances must in no way prevent us from making additional efforts with a view to guiding young people better and reassuring them concerning their own future and that of their country. By continuing to adapt educational programs and creating jobs, we are combating both the unfortunate consequences of failure in school and the proneness to violence which, unfortunately, is currently a phenomenon in society everywhere--some would even call it a (negative!) achievement by society--and we are also combating all manipulation of the unemployed by professional agitators.

The truth is that violence is never combated by violence. It is through the eradication of economic ills and social scourges, and also through sustained sociocultural action, that we have a chance of turning young people away from the paths of violence.

[Question] The government and you yourself, Mr Prime Minister, are constantly undertaking serious efforts to improve relations among the Maghreb countries and to contribute to the building of the Greater Maghreb on solid foundations. In what respects do you feel that the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, which

Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania have already signed, is a credible factor for smoothing out the current difficulties that are continuing to hamper the progress of the Maghreb?

[Answer] The Treaty of Fraternity and Concord is seen first of all as the crowning achievement of joint work that began 3 years ago. It is also a new departure toward a phase whose chief characteristic will be the joint execution of specific projects. The treaty will increase in value and importance every time the signatory parties take a step forward in economic cooperation. To overcome the psychological obstacles that may arise, we must build up the Maghreb in the awareness of our peoples and construct the Maghreb steadily through our daily work. The difficulties you mention will no doubt be ironed out. Our will to succeed, the inspiration that sustains us, and our unremitting efforts will surely bring us increasingly close to each other.

Although difficulties remain, they can only be temporary, and it would be unhealthy to make them into major obstacles.

[Question] Mohamed Mzali, as a man of the people, aren't you shocked to see some citizens adopting the lifestyle of a consumer society--sophisticated, superficial, and snobbish?

[Answer] In September 1980, a few months after I was appointed prime minister by President Habib Bourguiba, I had occasion to speak publicly at the Congress Palace concerning certain of those evils that are eating away at our society. I have not ceased since then to call for healthier and less irresponsible behavior. I said: "It happens that an employee can be exploited for 1, 2, or even 3 years. But it is impossible to put up with an intolerable situation forever.

"One day or another, the resentment he feels is bound to turn into rancor, and then there will be an explosion. Hatred, the source of which is the exploitation of man, engenders violence." I have not changed my opinion.

That being so, one can only be surprised that some people persist in amassing profits without remorse. Don't they know that just retribution exists and that they may pay the price for their unscrupulous voraciousness? Sizable fortunes only exacerbate family and social quarrels. Moreover, no matter what it does to go unnoticed, that minority's behavior arouses anger and criticism of those responsible. I say this out of a concern for the raising of moral standards, because I don't envy anyone. It is necessary that disorder of this kind should not take hold and that social resentments not lead to class struggle. President Habib Bourguiba has always gambled on national unity. There must not be a privileged minority whose circumstances in life arouse jealousy, give rise to hate, and threaten to prove Marx right! I have tried to explain all that so many times. Although I don't want to make "moral order" prevail, I will work constantly toward humanizing our social behavior to a greater degree and recalling the virtues of the moral imperatives. It will be a difficult job.

[Question] The Tunisian people now see you as a man of noble qualities: with great human and social sensitivity, generosity, a tolerant spirit, and a sense of solidarity. Some observers calling themselves well informed feel, however, that those qualities are political handicaps. Do you share their view when they say--referring to authors such as Raymond Aron--that politics must remain totally foreign to morality?

[Answer] If I understand those "well-informed observers" correctly, politics in that case would mean the exact opposite of humanism, high-mindedness, virtue, and tolerance.

I cannot accept that. And at the risk of defying the supporters of politicking realism, I persist in thinking that politics and morality are inseparable when it is a question of carrying out an undertaking in the public interest.

In any case, while some people may regard abiding by morality and respecting ethical values as a handicap in a political career, the remarkable success of the struggle by President Habib Bourguiba is a lesson for everyone in Tunisia and the Arab world. I will not change my opinion, and I will continue to impose that discipline on myself for as long as I live.

The fact is that without virtue, politics would be reduced to a game for ambitious people, and in politics, the end would justify any means.

11798

CSO: 4519/162

OFFSHORE ASSETS UP

Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 23 Apr 84 p 15

[Text]

BAHRAIN: Aggregate assets and liabilities of the island's 76 reporting offshore banking units for February this year are up by 3.4 per cent over January to \$59.95 billion, according to the Bahrain Monetary Agency.

By the end of February, loans to non-bank clients stood at 30.6 per cent of total assets, while deposits from the same sector formed 23.3 per cent of total liabilities.

Deposits from Arab countries reached \$39.4 billion — 65.7 per cent — of total liabilities.

Western European countries provided \$12.7 billion worth of deposits — 21.3 per cent of the total — and received \$15.3 billion — 25.4 per cent — worth of loans, while off shore centres had around \$3.9 billion — 6.5 per cent — of liabilities and \$5.3 billion — 8.8 per cent — of the total assets.

Regional currencies formed 19.2 per cent of total assets and 26.0 per cent of the total liabilities. The U.S. dollar comprised 73.0 per cent of total assets and 66.1 per cent of the total liabilities while other currencies comprised 7.8 per cent of assets and 7.9 per cent of liabilities.

Assets with maturities of up to one month accounted for 37.2 per cent of the total, between one and six months 36.3 per cent, and more than six months 26.5 per cent, compared to the corresponding figures of 39.4 per cent, 34.1 per cent, and 26.5 per cent, a month previously.

Liabilities with maturities of up to one month were 47.2 per cent of the total, between one and six months 44.3 per cent, and more than six months 8.5 per cent, compared to 48.5 per cent, 43.3 per cent, and 8.2 per cent in January.

CSO: 4400/232

ASSEMBLY VOTES ON NATIONALITY, OTHER ISSUES

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 2 May 84 pp 1, 4

[Article by Nabeel Suwaidan]

[Text]

KUWAIT's National Assembly yesterday rejected a draft bill to give Kuwaiti nationality to the children of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis.

The draft bill had been proposed by five deputies, who said the children should get nationality subject to certain restrictions.

The draft also recommended that a non-Kuwaiti Muslim married to a Kuwaiti woman should be given nationality if he lived in Kuwait for 20 years and had children by his wife.

The draft bill was rejected by 27 votes, including those of the government, to ten in favour and one abstention.

The Justice Minister pointed out that there was another draft on Arabs and non-Arabs who worked in the country and demanded nationality, and this was being reviewed by the assembly's internal and defence committee.

The Assembly also debated a draft bill to establish an independent state-owned construction company to build houses for the National Housing Authority.

Deputy Essa Al Shaheen said the draft law was sent to help speed up the construction of government houses and to end

cheating and exploitation by some contractors. The proposed company would be supervised by the NHA.

The Justice Minister said such a company would not solve the housing problem, and neither the NHA or the Savings and Credit Bank could supervise it.

The assembly returned the draft to the relevant committee for further study.

The assembly ratified a KD 2,797,400 budget for 1984-85 for the General Authority for Minors Affairs. Some deputies criticised the behaviour of some employees towards orphans and widows.

Deputy Jassim Al Oun said the funds of the authority should be invested according to the Islamic Sharia to protect the money of the orphans from generating usurious profits and also called for Kuwaitising posts in the authority. He pointed out that only 77 out of 340 employees were Kuwaitis.

The Justice Minister replied that all funds of the authority were invested through Kuwait Finance House, and real estates and shares were also managed by it.

Deputy Jassim Al Khorafi called for the use of modern methods in collecting and accounting for the money of minors.

The budget was approved by 40 in favour and one against.

The meeting began with Deputy Mutlaq Al Shilaimi commenting on the reply of the Justice Minister to his question about the number of Kuwaitis working in judicial departments, saying that the minister said that only 68 out of 197 staff were Kuwaitis. He demanded important posts be filled by Kuwaiti graduates. The Justice Ministers said that Kuwaiti graduates who joined the judicial staff occupied high posts.

Deputy Mohammed Al Rushaid then commented on the answer of the Public Works Minister regarding the suspension of work on some flyovers. Al Rushaid said many roads were closed and many accidents took place at these flyovers. He claimed the contracting company had friendly relations with the minister, and people were saying that KD 10 million had been paid to the contractor.

The Public Works Minister replied that the decision to suspend work on some flyovers had been taken last year, but work at flyovers had restarted in October. He pointed out that the deputy had submitted his question in March 1983, while work was suspended from May to October 1983.

NATION'S TELEVISION VIEWING, RADIO LISTENING HABITS REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-JAZIRAH in Arabic 4 May 84 p 18

[Article: "A Meaningful Analysis of the Citizen of Qatar through Television and Radio Sets"]

[Text] A report was issued recently on research monitoring viewers and listeners by the Ministry of Information in the state of Qatar regarding listening and viewing patterns in the city and suburbs of Doha, with the goal of preparing a Qatar media agency which would be able to realize the goals and purposes for which it was established.

In specifying the population of the study, the limits were set at the inhabitants of the city and suburbs of Doha as well as the towns of the north, al-Khawr and al-Wakrah; these are heavily populated areas in the community of Qatar, and indeed contain most of the inhabitants, with minor exceptions. Participating in this research were 32 male and female researchers who were chosen for their previous experience in the research area, and male and female students in the Department of Social Services at Qatar University, after receiving theoretical and practical training in the task which was assigned to them.

The research established that the proportion of television viewers is 98.2 percent, as compared with 1.8 percent who do not view Qatar's television programs (a sample was taken of the citizens). It is no wonder that the rate of viewers was high, since one can say that television viewing has become a general phenomenon among people in many societies and, since exposure to the message of the media is the way to go about learning about exerting influence, the broader the scope of learning becomes, the greater consequently becomes the opportunity for influence, all other conditions being equal. This lays great responsibility on the shoulders of television program planners in Qatar as far as the promotion of viewing is concerned. It has been observed that there is no statistically significant difference between viewing among the people of Qatar and their other Arab brethren. It has also been found that there are many viewers who regularly watch television every day; these account for about 71.2 percent of the number of people in the research sample, or almost three quarters of the society, and underline the point that television viewing is now a general phenomenon in this society.

In other words, it has become one of the daily habits of the majority of the people.

It has been found that women are more regular in their viewing than men, although men watch more than they do on some days, in accordance with circumstances. That might be attributed to the presence of women [at home] and their constant pursuit of television, contrary to men, the nature of whose work or circumstances of life in the society of Qatar dictates that they spend long periods outside the home, which reduces the likelihood of their being exposed to television; consequently their viewing is reduced. The report stated that illiterates are ahead of other educational groups in terms of daily viewing of television programs, followed by people who have completed preparatory, then secondary, then elementary education; people who can just read and write and people who have completed university education or above are in last place. It has also been established that there is no relationship between various educational levels and the degree of regularity in the viewing of Qatar television programs, since the difference that has been observed is not of significance statistically.

It has also been noted that as age increases, viewing gradually declines. The research revealed that some specific days are susceptible to slightly more viewing than others. It has been discovered that Fridays, Thursdays, Sundays and Mondays, respectively, constitute the main days in terms of the number of viewers, followed directly by Wednesday, Tuesday and finally Saturday. That may perhaps be attributed to the fact that Friday is the official weekly day off, and in addition most shops do not open on those days except in the mornings. Moreover, the transmission on that day is in two periods, the first in the morning, from 0900 hours, and the other in the afternoon, starting at 1300 hours, as opposed to other ordinary days, when transmission starts at 1500 hours, while on Thursday, the day before the day off, the period of late transmission lasts until 0100 hours in the morning, and the opportunity for staying up late, in addition to the presentation of attractive programs on that day, such as the new Arab movie, which has taken second place among the 10 most frequently watched programs, may attract a large viewing public. As for Sunday and Monday, because of the presence of mass programs, also, the world of sports program on Sunday, which occupied seventh place among the top 10 programs, as well as the old Arab movie, which occupied 10th place, and the hobbyists' club program on Monday, which occupied third place, have increased the number of viewers on those days.

It has been observed that the 15 to 25 age group watches the most Qatar television programs during the week. Viewing drops off gradually among the remaining age groups, in succession.

It is clear that a greater number of people in the 25 to 35 age group prefers Channel One to Channel Two than those in some other age groups. As regards the preference for Channel Two to Channel One, most of those who prefer the former are from 15 to 25. It is apparent, in studying the significance of the difference among age groups and the degree of preference for one channel over the other, that age has no effect in this preference. It has also been observed that close to half the reasons which the people in the study gave for preferring Channel Two over Channel One, or watching it

exclusively, lie in the availability of foreign materials, whether these are programs, movies or serials.

It was also found that 61.7 percent of the people watching Qatar television watch Channel One programs from 2000 hours in the evening to 2100 hours, which is the viewing peak for this channel. The reason for that is perhaps the availability of Arab serials at that time, which 87.1 percent of the population of program viewers prefer; it took first place among the programs. A gradual drop was also observed in the rate with the passage of time after 2100 hours or before 2000 hours, reaching the lowest viewing at the two ends of the transmission, the beginning and the end.

It was also observed that 90 percent of the people watching Qatar television programs have specific programs whose schedules they know, and they follow these schedules in order to watch them. This indicates that the periods of the programs presented are closely connected to the time they are presented, which causes the specific time to be connected to a specific program in the mind of the viewer. It was also discovered that there is no difference between people from Qatar and their other Arab brothers as far as knowing the schedules of the programs themselves and waiting for these programs in order to view them were concerned.

The Extent of Special Television Viewing

It appears that 57.7 percent of the study sample watches programs offered by foreign television services. The clear reception of foreign transmission, and interference from it on occasion, may be among the reasons for this receptivity. People generally do not avoid programming which reaches them easily, except merely while selecting. This receptivity also reflects a search for new things which might perhaps lead to material which is more satisfying to them.

It has been found that a large percentage regularly watches programs of other television services (43.4 percent), as compared with 33.7 percent who watch them sometimes. Regular viewing means that the viewer in Qatar has found material which pleases him in other television services, and has become attached to it, and that is underlined by the responses made by people who watch foreign television services, 60.9 percent of whom like some of what they watch in these programs and would like similar material to be offered on Qatar television.

The presence of a fundamental relationship between the level of education and foreign television service viewing is apparent, making it possible to say that the people who are at the bottom of the educational ladder might view more than people who are at the top of it.

There is no difference between the affinity among people from Qatar, and other people of the Gulf and other Arabs, for foreign television service programs.

Qatar Radio

The relationship between the number of people who listen to the radio as compared with the number of people who watch television is not restricted to Qatar Radio alone; rather, that has also been observed in many of the societies which television has entered, to the point where it has been said that broadcasting is directed to what might be tantamount to specialized service, since only people who listen to news and music sustain the level of listening that prevailed before the appearance of television. Whatever the case may be, broadcasting still has its traditional public, which is attached to it in spite of the appearance of television. What the research has shown, that 42 percent of the study sample still are concerned to listen to the radio regularly, may be the best evidence of this attachment. The research has also established that there is no relationship between listening and nationality. Men listen to the radio more than women, and the converse is true; young people listen to the radio more than old people, that is, the older one gets the less one listens to the radio, and the converse is also true.

The study has also established that government employees are more devoted to radio listening than others, followed directly by students, then in the same rank workers and housewives, followed by farmers, other people in other technical professions, and people with no jobs. After that come merchants. Employers are the job category that is least regular in radio listening.

The study has established that the frequency of listening by people from Qatar and their Arab brothers has three peaks, the first from 1300 hours to 1400 hours in the afternoon, which is the highest peak, followed by the second peak, from 0700 to 0800 hours in the morning, and then the third peak, from 1600 to 1700 hours in the afternoon.

The programs offered during transmission hours have led to this density at the first and third peaks. As for the second peak, which starts from 0600 hours, reaching its peak between 0700 and 0800 hours in the morning, perhaps it is the presence of the period of the news and the news summary in this period that has led to this density, especially when we realize that the news occupies second place among the programs listened to.

It has been found that 14.8 percent of Qatar Radio listeners listen to the English program broadcast. This radio serves people who speak English, people from Qatar or their Arab brothers, and foreigners whose dealings and conversation are based on the English language, not to mention people who are outside the borders of Qatar.

Broadcast of the Ordinary Program

It has been discovered that ordinary program listening does not assume a specific trend. Most listeners are in the 25-to-35 age group, followed by people from ages 15 to 25. This conclusion which we have reached shows the extent to which the listener is attached to his past and the heritage he has grown up in. For the first time, age is of secondary importance, in regard to viewing or listening, and the 15 to 25 age group occupies the lowest

rank. This affirms that older people usually are more attached to their past and their heritage, which the nature of the programs offered by the ordinary program broadcasting service reflects. The study has established that there is a relationship between the educational level and listening with regard to various Radio Qatar services in general.

Foreign Broadcasting

It has been observed that the majority of the people of Qatar who listen to foreign broadcasting services listen to Abu Dhabi radio, after which, in terms of the number of listeners, come Radio Kuwait, Radio Bahrain, Dubai Radio, then Saudi Radio, Radio London, Radio Cairo and finally Radio Oman.

Conclusions of the Research

The people performing the research have found that most people in the sample prefer to pursue programs which rely mostly in their presentation on moving images, through the screen; these generally interpret the material that is presented, and cause the mind to exert itself in thinking and imagining and generally help bring the information, facts and objectives the program wishes to state to the mind, through television. A small exception prefers the images on radio, since we should not ignore the radio's role in expanding the imagination of the listener and deepening his thinking as a result of the free rein it gives the mind to think and imagine the picture which might be before him at that moment.

11887

CS0: 4404/465

YEMENI BANK DECLARES INCREASED PROFITS, SERVICES

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 25 Apr 84 p 5

[Article: "At the Meeting of the Yemeni Bank Board of Directors: The Chairman of the Board: The Total General Budget for 1983 Came to 6,590,898,000"]

[Text] On the 20th of this month, Mr Ahmad Muhammad Thabit, chairman of the board of directors of the Yemeni Bank for Reconstruction and Development, gave the board of directors' report on the fiscal year ending 31 December 1983. The board of directors' report stated, in these words:

Honored brother members of the ordinary general assembly of the Yemeni Bank for Reconstruction and Development, peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you; finally:

In the name of the members of the board of directors and in my name personally, we are happy to welcome you to this annual meeting and thank you for your response to the invitation to attend this meeting to discuss the results of the fiscal year ending 31 December 1983.

Brother shareholders:

The role the Yemeni Bank is playing in various fields of banking activity is clearly apparent in the results your organization realized in 1983, as recorded in the budget presented to you.

In spite of all the international economic difficulties and the monetary and financial fluctuations which dominated the world last year, the bank managed to sustain its great level of banking activity, thanks to the great confidence it enjoys domestically and abroad.

It also managed to expand the volume of its activities and continued to offer a high level of services to its customers, thus maintaining its dominant position among Arab and foreign banks in the country. Before we review the overall activities of the bank with you, we should not miss the opportunity to give thanks to our employees for the efforts they exerted in service of this organization, which resulted in the attainment of this progress in the bank's activities. We also offer thanks and appreciation to all our

honored clients for the confidence they have placed in this pioneering organization.

Herewith are the various features of the activities of the Yemeni Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as the figures in the budget show them.

The statements on the sections of the general budget for 1983:

At the end of 1983, the total general balance came to 6,590,898,000 riyals, as compared with 5,303,682,000 riyals the preceding year, that is, an increase of 24 percent.

Assets

On the asset side, the total cash in the treasury and in banks came to 2,148,484,000 riyals, as compared with 1,304,161,000 riyals last year.

Loans and credit came to 1,679,603,000 riyals. With respect to investments, as of 31 December 1983 they totalled 126,929,000 riyals.

As for the balance of other assets, they totalled 308,535,000 riyals. Of this sum, 296,076,000 riyals were diverse civilian accounts and the remaining sum, 12,459,000 riyals, represents the account of projects under construction.

The value of fixed assets after depreciation came to 59,274,000 riyals; these assets represent buildings which the bank uses in its activities in Sanaa, al-Hudaydah, Ta'izz, Dhamar and Rida'. They also include real property and other parcels of land, on some of which buildings will be erected for use as headquarters for its branch activities.

Liabilities

On the liability side, the total accounts of local banks and correspondents abroad up to the end of 31 December 1983 came to 466.28 million riyals.

The balance of clients' demand accounts and savings accounts, and insurance, rose to 3,143,359,000 riyals, as compared with 2,484,550,000 riyals last year, that is, an increase of about 22.5 percent. As for the balance of other liabilities, the total of that came to 509.81 million riyals, as compared with 465,117,000 riyals last year.

Allocations

The balance of allocations on 31 December 1983 came to 270,757,000 riyals, as recorded in the registers of the bank. From that, as stated in the budget, the following sums were removed:

1. The sum of 141,777,000 riyals in allocations for suspect debts. This was subtracted in the statement of the budget from loans and credit.

2. The sum of 17 million riyals in allocations to the housing project, which was subtracted from the project balance in the statement of the budget.

158,777,000 riyals is the total sum subtracted from allocations. When this is subtracted, the balance of the allocations in the general budget appears as the sum of 111.98 million riyals.

Capital and Reserves

The permitted capital comes to 100 million riyals (one hundred million riyals), paid up in full.

With respect to reserves, the balance of reserves on 31 December 1983 came to 218,254,341 riyals as compared with 221,509,341 riyals which appeared in the general balance for 1983 [sic]. Herewith is a statement on the reserves:

1. Legal reserves, 96,309,341 riyals.
2. Investment reserves, 70 million riyals.
3. General reserves, 55.2 million riyals.

Total, 221,509,341.

Revenues and Expenditures

Total bank revenues on 12 December 1983 came to 320,193,000 riyals, as compared with the sum of 311,371,000 riyals last year.

With respect to general expenditures, on 31 December 1983 these came to 134,173,000.

Interest paid up to 31 November [sic] 1983 came to 105,474,000 riyals.

After the deduction of general expenditures and interest paid out of total revenues, the bank then had a profit of 80,546,000. From this was deducted the sum of 48 million riyals, which was allocated to allocation accounts, so that the net profit of the bank came to 32,546,000 riyals, as is apparent in the profit and loss account, in accordance with Article 57 of the bylaws of the Yemeni Bank and recommendation of the board of directors. After your approval of the contents of the report and the final accounts presented to you, we ask the following of you:

1. Approval of the report of the board of directors and the account auditors on the general balance and the final accounts for the fiscal year ending 31 December 1983 and clearance of the members of the board of directors for everything related to their management for this year.
2. Approval of the distribution of the profits according to the recommendation of the board of directors; their share is 25 percent, from which the tithe and stamp levies are to be deducted.

3. Permission of the board of directors to make contributions within the limits of the provisions of Article 26 of the bank's bylaws.

4. Approval of the appointment of an auditor for the accounts of the Yemeni Bank for 1984 and determination of his fees.

5. Determination of the membership of the members of the board of directors whose membership period has elapsed, or selection of an alternative.

General Balance Sheet on 31 December 1983

Assets	Explanations	1983 (Thousands of Riyals)	1982
Cash in the Treasury and Banks		474,052	708,208
Deposits with Banks		1,674,432	595,953
Loans and Credit		1,679,603	1,537,523
Investments in Subsidiary Companies and Commercial Joint Liability Companies	3	109,644	92,059
Other Investments	4	17,285	12,471
Housing Project	5	155,726	128,444
Other Assets		308,535	373,658
Fixed Assets	6	59,274	45,846
Total Assets Before Regular Accounts		4,478,551	3,494,162
Regular Accounts with Compensation	7	2,112,347	1,809,520
[Total]		6,590,898	5,303,682
Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity			
Bank Accounts		466,280	
Current Accounts of Clients and Demand, Term and Savings Deposits		3,043,359	2,484,550
Other Liabilities	20	509,810	465,117

Allocations	8	111,980	201,125
Profits Proposed To Be Distributed	9	25,000	
Total Deductions before Regular Accounts		4,156,429	3,150,792
Capital	10	100,000	100,000
Reserves	11	221,509	216,800
Profits Reserved before Distribution		613	26,570
Total Shareholders' Equity		322,122	343,370
Total Liabilities And Shareholders' Equity before Regular Accounts		4,478,551	3,494,162
Regular Accounts with Compensation	7	2,112,347	1,809,520
[Total]		6,590,898	5,303,682

[Budget] for the Fiscal Year Ending 31 December 1983

Explanations	1983 (Thousands of Riyals)	1982
Interest Received	215,423	210,891
Interest Paid out	105,474	99,301
Net Interest Received	109,949	111,590
Currency Differentials	15,318	27,192
Commissions and Other Revenues	89,452	73,288
[Subtotal]	214,719	212,070
Expenditures and Allocations	182,173	175,531
Net Profits Last Year	32,456	36,539

Statement of Distribution of
Profits

Profits Carried over from Last Year		37,570	31
Settlements Concerning Previ- ous Years	13	3,794	--
Balance after Settlements		32,776	31
Net Profits for Year		32,546	36,539
[Total]		65,322	36,570

Distribution

Carried over to Reserves			
Special Carryover after 1982		11,454	
Proposed Carryover for 1983	11	3,255	
Profits Proposed for Distribu- tion to Stockholders			
Paid up for 1982		25,000	
Proposed for Distribution in 1983	9	25,000	
[Subtotal]			64,709
Profits Reserved on 31 December 1983		613	36,570

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CS0: 4404/463

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

INDUSTRIAL BANK CHAIRMAN GIVES RUNDOWN OF LAST YEAR'S RESULTS

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 8 May 84 p 5

[Article: "A Splendid Economic Performance, at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Ordinary General Assembly of Yemeni Industrial Bank Shareholders"]

[Text] Statement by the chairman of the board:

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In the name of God, the all-merciful and most compassionate:

Brothers, honored members of the general assembly:

I am happy to meet with you and review the seventh report of the board of directors of the Yemeni Industrial Bank for the year ending 31 December 1983 with you.

When I review the general figures for our activity in the past year with you, the extent of our success as a development institution in realizing industrial growth through the credit facilities and technical services we offer, which contribute to the realization of many industrial projects, will be clearly apparent.

I can summarize the general indicators of the bank's activity in 1983 as follows:

First, an increase of 20 percent in the volume of lending to major and medium industrial projects over the preceding year.

Second, an increase of 25.1 percent in the volume of lending to small industrial projects over the preceding year.

Brothers, I can say that the gains and achievements that are being realized for our country represent only one accomplishment, which is a direct result of the natural output of the support and encouragement of the political leadership, as embodied in our brother the president and general commander, secretary general of the general people's conference, Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih.

I can review the results of the bank's activity during the past year, 1983, with you in the following manner:

First, Domestic Activity

1. Industrial lending:

The volume of loans to large and medium industrial projects in 1983 came to 47.33 million riyals, as compared with 39,442,600 riyals in 1982, an increase of 7,887,400 riyals; thus the volume of loans in 1983 increased by 20 percent over their volume the previous year.

With respect to craft projects and small projects whose cost was less than 500,000 riyals, the volume of loans in 1983 came to 1,571,000 riyals as compared with 1,256,000 riyals in 1982, or an increase of 315,000 riyals or 25.1 percent over the previous year.

The volume of loans granted in 1983 relative to the overall estimated cost of projects came to 34.2 percent. Last year, this proportion came to 32 percent. This shows an increase in the bank's contribution to the coverage of project costs.

2. The geographic distribution of industrial loans:

The loans approved were concentrated more in the Governorate of Sanaa than the other governorates. This pattern of loan distribution is considered a continuation of the situation that existed in previous years, in spite of the bank's concern that there be a broader distribution of the loans the bank grants. Nonetheless, new governorates made their appearance and received a share of the loans approved in 1983, such as the Governorates of Hajjah and Dhamar, and we hope that the other governorates' share will increase in coming years.

Table Three [sic]: The Geographic Distribution of Loans Approved in 1983 (thousands of riyals)

Governorate	Number	Volume of Loans	Share of Cash [percent]
Sanaa	12	30,341	64.1
Ta'izz	3	5,530	11.7
Al-Hudaydah	2	7,822	16.5
Dhamar	1	1,687	3.6
Hajjah	1	1,950	4.1
Total	19		100

3. Classification of industrial loans by sector:

The breakdown of industrial loans approved in 1983, by sector, in general reflects the tendency to invest for the most part on the construction sector, as this sector's share of the total loans approved came to 40.6 percent.

However, a person observing the movement of the investment of money in 1983 can note a sort of diversification that was greater than in the previous year, since new industries appeared which the bank financed for the first time, such as the leather industries, whose share came to 16.9 percent, and the paper industries, whose share came to 8.2 percent.

Table Four: Geographic Distribution of Loans Approved in 1983 (thousands of riyals)

Sector	Number	Volume of Loans	Share of Cash [percent]
Construction material industries	10	19,211	40.6
Leather industries	2	8,000	16.9
Food industries	1	6,000	12.7
Paper industries	1	3,913	8.3
Plastic industries	1	3,577	7.6
Iron industries	2	3,422	7.2
Chemical industries	2	3,207	6.7
Total	19	47,220	100

Table Five: Yemeni Industrial Bank Contributions to the Capital of Projects up to the End of 1983 (in thousands of riyals)

Number -- Project	Capital	Industrial Bank's Share
1. National Construction Materials Company	20,000	1,400
2. The Ma'rib Poultry Company	66,135	4,500
3. The Yemeni Investment and Financing Company	100,000	500
4. The Yemeni Salt Refining and Packaging Company	19,000	1,123

4. The bank's contribution to project capital:

In the area of the bank's contribution to the capital of industrial projects, the bank contributed the sum of 3.42 million riyals to the Yemeni Salt Refining and Packaging Company. The bank's former contributions remained as they were, without change. Table Five shows the bank's contributions to the capital of projects up to the end of 1983.

Second, the Bank's Foreign Activity

Since its establishment, the management of the Industrial Bank has been anxious to strengthen its relations with international and Arab financing institutions in order to support the bank's resources and capabilities. In this context, consultations took place in 1982 with the International Development Organization to grant the Industrial Bank a second loan. Up to the end of 1983 the results of the consultations were positive, and they promise the possibility that the bank's efforts in obtaining the loan will succeed.

In addition, we will subsequently inform you through the annual reports of the board of directors of the results and the fruit of the bank's foreign relations.

Third, Financial Statements on the Year Ending 31 December 1983

The total budget on 31 December 1983 came to 153,490,365 riyals, an increase of 34,480,261 riyals over the total budget for the past year. First:

[One] Assets:

1. Cash in the treasury and deposits with banks:

The cash reserves in the treasury and deposits with banks at the end of 31 December 1983 came to 25,353,934 riyals, that is, an increase of 14,149,383 riyals over last year. This sum includes short term deposits totalling 17,553,215 riyals, or an increase of 10,553,215 riyals over last year. The increase in cash and deposits can be attributed to the following:

A. The coverage of part of the preferred shares through the subscription of new stock, totalling 3.85 million riyals.

B. The policy the bank's management followed of obtaining foreign sources of financing; withdrawals from the International Development Organization came to 21.2 million riyals in 1983.

2. Investments:

The balance of industrial and craft loans on 31 December 1983 came to 96,315,416 riyals, an increase of 9,252,843 riyals over last year. This can be shown as follows:

93,358,257 in medium- and long-range industrial loans.

2,774,258 in craft loans under United Nations guarantee.

96,315,416 total.

One should bear in mind that there is a sum of 7,215,033 riyals for interest due which did not appear within the loans shown above. This can be shown as follows:

96,315,416, balance of industrial and craft loans (capital due and not due).

7,215,033 to be added as amounts due in loan interest.

103,530,449 total.

This sum, totalling 103,530,449 riyals, appeared in the balance for the end of 31 December 1983 as follows:

81,532,096, loans under the heading of investments.

21,998,353, clients and agents under the heading of debtors.

103,530,449, total loans up to 31 December 1983.

Investments:

The balance of investments on 31 December 1983 came to 8,823,477 riyals, that is, an increase of 2,423,477 riyals over last year. These contributions can be stated as follows:

Amount of Contribution (riyals)	Proportion of Contribution [Percent]	Name of Company
1,400,000	7	National Construction Materials Company
4,500,000	6.8	Ma'rib Poultry Company
500,000	0.5	Yemeni Investment and Financing Company
1,123,077	6.3	Yemeni Salt Refining and Packaging Company
7,523,077 [Subtotal]		
1,300,400		Other investments (ownership of the Balk plant)
8,823,477 Total		

Two: Liabilities:

1. Creditors:

The balance of credit in circulation on 31 December 1983 came to 8,903,637 riyals, which is embodied in the following headings:

Riyals:

5,530,993, various creditor obligations

1,027,070, reserved insurance

1,020,202, expenses due

1,335,372, profit shares distributed

8,903,637 [total]

2. Loans (borrowing):

A. The loan on the joint building with a Ministry of Finance guarantee:

In 1981 the Yemeni Central Bank gave the Yemeni Industrial [Bank] and the Housing and Industrial Complex Bank a loan of 17 million riyals to finance approximately 50 percent of construction costs.

This loan is distributed equally among the three organizations. The Industrial Bank's share of the sums paid up as of the date of the balance statement came to 5,666,667 riyals.

B. International Development Organization 465 facilities:

Facilities of the International Development Organization, US \$450,000 to finance industrial projects at the site of the General Industrial Complex Organization. The loans for 50 percent of the sums paid up for these projects are attributable to the bank.

The sums paid up for two projects came to 1,858,295 riyals up to 31 December 1983.

C. International Development Organization 1122 loan:

The loan referred to has been given to the government of the Yemen Arab Republic, and totals 9,700,000 in special drawing rights (about 48 million Yemeni riyals) to finance industrial projects in the Yemen Arab Republic. The loan also includes the sum of US \$250,000 in technical aid. The amount of the loan has been lent back to the Yemeni Industrial Bank.

At the date of the balance statement, total withdrawals from the International Development Organization came to 22.06 million riyals, for industrial projects financed by the bank from the total amount agreed upon, which totals 30.9 million riyals.

D. Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development loan 205:

The Kuwaiti loan agreement gives the Industrial Bank a loan of about 4 million Kuwaiti dinars (around 64 million Yemeni riyals) to be used to finance industrial projects in the Yemen Arab Republic at the date of the balance statement. A sum of 319,292 riyals was then withdrawn.

3. Investors' assets:

100 million in authorized capital.

700,000 ordinary shares, with a value of 100 riyals per share.

300,000 preferred shares, with a value of 100 riyals per share.

The capital has been issued and paid up in full.

70 million riyals, the value of ordinary shares paid up in full by the government.

22,744,900 riyals, the value of preferred shares.

92,744,900, the total capital issued and paid up in full.

4. Reserves. These are embodied in the following headings:

5,390,907, legal reserve.

8,892,194, general reserve.

14,283,101, total up to 31 December 1983.

Three, Profit and Loss Account

One. Revenues:

The bank's revenues on 31 December 1983 came to 12,725,953 riyals.

Expenditures came to 10,588,580 riyals on 31 December 1983. Thus, the net profit before distribution was 2,137,373 riyals (while the profits last year, before distribution, came to 3,752,347 riyals). The decline in net profit may be attributed to the following causes:

1. The increase in interest paid on loans granted by the government and by the International Development Authority, number 1122.
2. The decline in the rates of interest on deposits in 1983.
3. The increase in the proportion allocated for suspect debts.

Two. Recommended distribution of the net profits, as follows:

Riyals:

534,343, legal reserve, 25 percent.

267,658, general reserve.

1,335,372, profits recommended for distribution, at a rate of 7 percent, to holders of preferred shares.

2,137,373, total.

Three. Allocations of suspect debts:

Consideration has been given to the need for establishing an allocation (including the specified allocation) in the range of 6 percent (4.5 percent in 1982) of the total investment portfolio, along with other interest charges and levies. Consideration has also been given to making an allocation for debtor obligations, since the reserve allocated to suspect debts on 31 December 1983 came to the following:

Riyals:

4,367,113, allocated to previous years.

2,348,271, allocated to 1983.

6,715,384, total allocated on 31 December 1983.

Brothers, members of the general assembly:

We thank you for your sincere response in attending this meeting, and we have hopes that we will meet next year, having realized further achievements along the road to development and improvement in the context of our upright political leadership.

Peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you.

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CSO: 4404/463

SOVIETS GUIDED BY OFFENSIVE STRATEGY

Paris LE MONDE in French 6-7 May 84 p 3

[Article by Patrice de Beer]

[Text] As information continues to filter bit by bit out of Afghanistan, it seems that the Soviet offensive begun two weeks ago around the strategic Panjshir Valley has in fact spread throughout the country. It is this factor, at least as much as the number of troops and the material used (LE MONDE of 26 April) that testifies to the importance of the stakes for Kremlin strategists.

In their struggle against the resistance, the Soviets have let a real prize slip away, "Commander" Mas'ud, head of the resistance in the Panjshir and coordinator of the fighting in four provinces north of Kabul--Baghlan, Kapisa, Kundunz and Parwan. The Jam'iat-e Eslami, Mas'ud's party, received a message in Peshawar, Pakistan on Thursday, 3 May, from Mas'ud, who is no longer in the valley. Sent on 30 April, it gives the initial details and his version of the fighting in the Panjshir region. After the bombing initiated on 21 April, the Afghan-Soviet offensive got underway beginning on the 26th. Despite stubborn resistance, the Soviets seem to have reached the end of the valley. To do this, they reportedly used gas warfare, which enabled them to step up their advance and caused nearly 400 deaths among their adversaries.

At the same time, they attacked the Andarab Valley north of Panjshir, which is richer and more heavily populated, and a secondary strategic area of the resistance. The resistance fighters retaliated in the valley and outside as well. According to Commander Mas'ud, they shot down several planes and helicopters, destroyed dozens of tanks and more than 150 trucks, and killed 1,000 Soviet Afghans in sectors of Andarab, in the Chamali plain northwest of Kabul and around Salang hill. He did not mention his own losses. The road between Kabul and the USSR, which runs by this hill, has been cut off after 17 bridges were destroyed.

Despite this resistance, and information which made it possible to evacuate civilians and to arrange the strategic retreat of most Mujahidins, it appears that the Soviets currently control the Panjshir and the bulk of the Andarab valley.

Ever since February, Soviet troops have in fact been gradually and systematically closing in on the Panjshir region, conducting ground operations and transporting shock troops of commandos by helicopter and parachute--two out of the eight elite Soviet airborne forces are in Afghanistan--on the two roads leading to Pakistan, and on the hills overlooking the valley and linking it with the outside world. These commandos, deposited sometimes at night, operate as far away as Paktia, more than 100 kilometers southeast of Kabul, or in Nurestan. At the same time, to avoid the serious dangers of ambushes on the direct route from the USSR to Kabul, the Soviets have strengthened their forces along the strategic southern route. This explains the renewal of fighting around the towns of Herat, in the western part of the country, and Qandahar, in the south, where there have been violent bombing attacks for the past few weeks.

Deserted, the Panjshir valley is occupied by the Soviets. The Andarab Valley, which has not seen as much combat and is not as well prepared for war, would be an equally important victory. If the Russians succeed in sealing off access to this area, they would cut off food supplies, ammunition and troop reinforcements, and would corner the resistance fighters in an inhospitable region of high mountains. The Afghan fighters know the land extremely well, but the balance of power is hardly in their favor. The Russians have assigned about 30,000 men to the operation--about half of whom are in the Panjshir--and, with the spring troop relief, will have increased their expeditionary force of 110,000 men to about 140,000 men equipped with sophisticated weaponry. New elite Afghan troops, more reliable and effective than the regular army (LE MONDE of 14 April), are gradually entering the action.

If this offensive succeeds, its psychological impact in Afghanistan and abroad could be serious. Strategically, it would "freeze" a key resistance area and block access to very active resistance zones near the Soviet border (the Mazar-e-Sharif region).

To accomplish this, more than 10,000 men would have to be immobilized in fixed positions difficult to defend and resupply, in the mountains, sometimes more than 3,000 meters away. The Russians would also have to give up their so-called raid tactics of "hits" by tanks and troop transports, and instead send out their soldiers on foot to fight in hostile terrain, with the risk of heavy losses. We will have to wait a few weeks to find out whether they will decide to occupy the conquered land or to withdraw, as they have done in the past.

But will military success be accompanied by political victory? At present, there is a trend more towards a unification of the resistance. Diversionary operations have in fact been mounted in various parts of the country, and now we are seeing the first efforts at coordinating formerly rival Mujahidins--out of necessity. Troop reinforcements were sent to the Mazar-e-Sharif and Hazarajat regions. The resistance fighters probably are aware that the Panjshir offensive, even though it may have been more difficult, time-consuming and costly than Moscow expected, is only the first of a series of operations aimed at eliminating them and propping up the tottering, dependent regime in Kabul. For the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, as for Vietnam in Cambodia, a military victory is a prerequisite for any "political" solution.

RABBANI: WE NEED ARMS INSTEAD OF FOOD

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Claude Lorieux: "Professor Rabbani, One of the Leaders of the Resistance, Exposes Soviet Airlift to Afghanistan"]

[Text] The USSR has considerably reinforced its military capability in Afghanistan and adjacent to that country, and has been conducting "a generalized coordinated action" for the past several weeks with no possible comparison with the now-traditional "spring offensives."

This is what comes out of consistent information gathered in the capitals of the region, in Washington and from important people in the Afghan resistance.

Passing through Paris two weeks apart, Amin Wardak, one of the guerrilla leaders from the north, and Professor Rabbani, president of the Jam'iat-e Eslami party (a moderate Muslim), both underscored the breadth of the war effort just recently started by the Soviet expeditionary corps. Abdul Haq, commandant for Kabul of the Hezb-e Eslami party (of the courageous mullah Yunus Kholes) indicated to us at the end of March that the Soviets had beefed up protection at their installations in the capital.

Professor Rabbani, who was just received by the secretary-general of the Quai d'Orsay, Francis Gutman, is adamant: "Since 15 March, an airlift has been carrying reinforcements and arms." This 40-year-old with his long salt-and-pepper beard, who was the first--and the only--representative of the resistance at the recent Islamic summit in Casablanca, estimates these reinforcements at 80,000 men. More cautiously, the ECONOMIST of London spoke of 50,000 men without excluding the fact that these "new arrivals" have not been either totally or partially offset by bringing troops back home. Such an increase probably has a political as well as a military significance, it is prudently noted in Paris.

These indications are all the more intriguing to observers since it has been learned from official sources in Washington that 36 large Soviet TU-16 bombers and 100 lighter aircraft have recently arrived at airports near the Afghan border. In the federal capital, however, people were very careful not to affirm that these aircrafts--whose use would constitute a "first" in the fight against the Mujahidin--are in fact intended for the Afghan conflict.

The Soviet-Afghan forces are concentrated on three "fronts": the provinces bordering on the USSR (Mazar, Kunduz, Badakhshan), the resistance's regions of transit toward the Pakistani "sanctuaries" (Djellalabad, Paktia), and the areas adjacent to the highway linking Kabul to the Soviet border. It is thus that violent battles have already taken place in the plain of Shomali, north of the capital. Nevertheless, the offensive expected--and moreover announced by some--against the Panjshir Valley, the "show-place of the resistance," has not yet started, according to Professor Rabbani.

Commandant Mas'ud, who belongs to the Jam'iat-e Eslami, took advantage of a truce proposed by the Soviets to reorganize the economy and the defenses of his stronghold. However, the truce was not renewed; Mas'ud has let it be known, moreover, that government agents tried to assassinate him.

Washington's Promises

This "strategy of local truces," applied to the Panjshir, in the important Shi'ite region of Hazarajat, and elsewhere... does not only have partisans within the resistance. "I do not know what Mas'ud wants; I do not want to blame him, but we do not like the idea of a truce," said Abdul Haq, the military boss of the Hesb-e Eslami in Kabul. "In fact," he explained, "the Russians do not have enough men to attack everywhere; that is why they are multiplying their truces, to be able to attack elsewhere."

Professor Rabbani underscores however that this bizarre agreement between Mas'ud and the Soviet occupying forces has not prevented the young war leader from mounting operations, most notably in the strategic Salang pass (on the Kabul-USSR highway.) The resistance actions moreover are believed to have momentarily caused a serious shortage of fuel in Kabul.

Receiving several journalists in a friendly apartment, sitting cross-legged on the low divan, Professor Rabbani does not hide his disappointment more than a year after the promises of military aid made by Washington. "These are seasonal propaganda balloons," he says without raising his voice, while swaying the top part of his body as if he were chanting a prayer in the mosque. He adds: "We do not see anything concrete in the field." Abdul Haq was even more bitter: "The United States," he told us, "has a big mouth. It talks a lot and gives nothing."

The leader of the Jam'iat-e Eslami certainly rejoices at the diplomatic support given to the Mujahidin by Moslem and Western countries, and again confirmed by his French interlocutors. But he regrets that neither neighboring Iran nor the Arab countries are furnishing military aid to his men. (President Sadat, one remembers, had publicly announced that he was sending arms to the resisters. NDLR).

Rabbani continues: "The West sends us food and milk as if we were children who need to be pacified.¹ It will be a long time before the world finds another opportunity to counter Soviet expansionism. The West's reaction is currently weak; it is even cowardly."

¹ Between two and three million Afghans live in the refugee camps in Pakistan.

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SOVIET LONG RANGE OCCUPATION DILEMMA EXAMINED

Offensive Expected

Paris LIBERATION in French 2 May 84 pp 2-6

[Reportage in 2 May 84 issue, consisting of several items under heading "The Soviet Offensive in Afghanistan" and item on Mas'ud under the heading "Headliners"]

[Text] The Afghans were expecting this offensive, the seventh since the occupation of their country by Soviet troops. The latter have now become part of the daily life of the Afghans, who, for the past 5 years have been resisting the world's largest army. The Afghans know of these offensives well in advance, so extensive is the infiltration of the state apparatus by the mujahidin. Several days before the arrival of the Soviet liberators with their tanks and bombers, the civilians go into hiding or take refuge in Pakistan, in accordance with a scenario that is now well known. Then, the Soviets advance with all the Red Army's vaunted weight and power. This year, they have pulled out all stops, even to announcing the death of the Afghans' young commander. Ten days after the start of the offensive, RADIO KABUL's trumpeting of initial successes are being transformed into laconic communiques. The Red Army appears very much to have once again bumped into its limits (see article this page [JPRS related item "Red Army's Seventh Attempt" below]). But in the absence of any reports from independent sources (see p 5 [JPRS related item "Media Restrictions" below]), one must proceed slowly in arriving at any conclusions. Be that as it might, as Jean-Jose Puig--one whose travels to and through that country over the past several years have given him an extensive knowledge of it--explains [JPRS related item "Mas'ud's Panjshir Objectives" below], Mas'ud has been able to spread his ideas and to try to transform the northeast sector, one-fourth of the country, into a gigantic Panjshir (see "Headliners," p 6 [JPRS related item "More on Mas'ud,

Panjshir" below)). Against this resistance, Andropov had opted for a disintegration of it from within and the use of infiltration techniques. His successor has chosen the power approach (see p 3 [JPRS related item "Chernenko's Policy vs Andropov's" below]). There is no assurance that he will be any more successful than was the USSR's top cop.

Red Army's Seventh Attempt

Paris LIBERATION in French 2 May 84 p 2

[Article by Beatrix Bacconier [spelling of surname as published]]

[Text] Islamabad (from our correspondent)--For the seventh time since 1979, Soviet tanks and bombers are attempting to hem in the Panjshir Valley, where Commandant Mas'ud's men will, this time, have the benefit of reinforcements in men and materiel.

On the 10th day of the seventh offensive launched against Panjshir, it appears the Red Army has adopted the same strategy it used in its first six. This new offensive, which marks the end of the truce agreed with "Commandant" Ahmad Shah Mas'ud around the end of 1982, began on 21 April with intensive high-altitude aerial bombardments. As in its previous offensives, the Red Army used some 40 Tupolev's, the Soviet B-52's, operating from bases in the USSR, to destroy the valley. On the morning of the 21st, as Mas'ud had anticipated some 15 days earlier, the first columns of tanks, armored vehicles and troop carriers entered the southern end of the valley, bringing in between 5,000 and 10,000 Soviet troops (20 percent of the combat forces in the 100,000-troop Soviet contingent) and 2,000 Afghans (half as many as previously).



Some of them (some 100 according to resistance sources) were blown by the mines placed by Mas'ud's men, mines which the latter had captured during the previous offensives. Three days later, the Red Army troops were in control of the lower third of the valley and had reached the village of Bozorak, 50 km inside the valley. Since then, no information has reached Islamabad regarding the situation in the Panjshir Valley after 24 April.

Mas'ud is not believed to have offered any resistance inside the valley. As in the other offensives, he is believed to have withdrawn further north into the adjacent mountains and valleys, using a tactic that has stood him in good stead already six times: Let the Soviet forces spread out in the valley before harrassing them. Mas'ud's whereabouts are unknown and have been since 21 April. A report by an Afghan diplomat in Delhi that he was dead was denied by diplomats and members of the resistance in Pakistan. At Peshawar, a message from him is being awaited with mounting concern. According to "Western diplomatic sources" in Islamabad, he is believed to have fled from the valley on 18 April to avoid falling into the hands of the Khalq (the Afghan KGB) hit men, who had infiltrated his troops following the truce. But a spokesman for his party, the Jam'iat Eslami, has announced that a message from Mas'ud to another "commandant" indicates that he is still in the valley with his men.

Having been tipped off by their infiltrated agents in Kabul as to the coming new offensive of the 21st, the mujahidin concentrated their attacks, beginning in mid-April, on the Soviets' main access route, the Salang highway, blowing up three bridges on 16 April. The destruction of the Mattok Bridge cut the road off for 3 days while the Soviet engineers built a new bridge .3 km upstream. Four days later, the same highway was the scene of a spectacular attack on a huge convoy of oil tankers traveling toward Kabul to re-supply it. On the 21st, the mujahidin of the Hezb-i Eslami (a rival party to the Jam'iat Eslami within the resistance) supported Mas'ud's men in an attack on the Bagram air base, located about halfway between Kabul and the Panjshir. The attack appears to have been rather ineffective, in that, according to the diplomats, it did not reduce the volume of helicopter traffic based there.

Twenty-four hours prior to the entry of the Soviet troops into the Panjshir, the maquisards destroyed the Soviet-Afghan garrison at Onawa, where they took several hundred prisoners.

Inside the valley, the battle had not yet begun as of 24 April. Losses were minimal. Word is being awaited at Peshawar as to whether Mas'ud--who it seems has, since the last offensive, received a reinforcement of weapons and men (5,000 men are believed to have been signed up)--has already begun harrassment of the Soviet forces. Military experts feel that while it is easy enough for the Soviets to enter the valley, they will encounter considerable difficulties if they attempt to occupy it permanently. To wage a counter-guerrilla war, they will have to dismount from their tanks and use airborne commandos who will be vulnerable against Mas'ud's mobile groups. These experts add that supplies, especially oil, are posing major logistical

problems to the Soviets, which is one reason they have not committed more than 100,000 men in Afghanistan. Attacks along the Salang highway, like those of 2 weeks ago, are creating serious shortages in the Afghan capital.

Mas'ud, on the other hand, is receiving support from other commandants in the region, especially since the truce, which he used to advantage to unify the resistance in the northeastern section of the country. He has received reinforcements and arms from Badakshan and from Balkh in the north, but also from Nouristan and Ghazni in the south.

RADIO KABUL, the official Afghan radio station, which on the night of 22 April had announced the "capitulation" of the maquisards and a "lightning-bolt" victory for the "Afghan army," without mentioning the Soviet participation, made no further reference but to its "success" in its latest bulletin.

Chernenko's Policy vs Andropov's

Paris LIBERATION in French 2 May 84 p 3

[Article by Alexandre Adler]

[Text] On the heels of Andropov's masterly strategy, which held out hopes for a negotiated solution of the invasion, Chernenko, for his part, is seeking a decisive military victory with the object of firming up his authority.

Desirous of displaying his authority and of winning the backing of the country's traditional military leaders, Chernenko, in a complete about-face, has now dismantled the well-laid Andropovian plan. It is precisely at what was to be the testing point of the "warriors' peace" strategy, Panjshir, that the new Soviet leadership now seeks a military victory, in the style of the "pacification of the [Algerian] Kabylia." The price of these victories is well known.

The invasion of Afghanistan actually began as a result of the Camp David agreements. Convinced that the aim of the United States was to totally end Soviet influence in the Middle East, the Soviet leadership, beginning in 1978, embarked on an activist policy in all directions.

This new activism embodies the aims of its three major interest-groups:

--Its "ideologues," whose leader within the top echelon of the Soviet hierarchy was Suslov, feel that China's and the United States's third-world difficulties open vast opportunities to the USSR, if the latter exploits them properly. They advocate a strategic alliance, modeled on the Libya-Ethiopia-South Yemen axis, with the revolutionary movements, Islamic or not, in the Middle East;

--Its Armed Forces elements most involved in the development of the means of global projection of Soviet power: Its Navy and its foreign-deployment components. In the latent debate within the military apparatus, the proponents of this activist strategy are also the advocates of strong and traditionalist armed forces;

--Its forces which, within the apparatus, fear the sapping of the party's authority, Westernism, etc... and see in shows of external power a means of palliating the rampant internal crisis: Within the Brezhnevian entourage, men like his brother-in-law, Tsvigoun, then first vice president of the KGB, and Chernenko, were of this group.

It was these three groups that, when Prince Daoud's republican regime ran into difficulties, favored the solution by force in Afghanistan, consisting of a military push to impose an outright communist government, that of the Khalq group. The KGB leadership, including Andropov, the head of the government Kosygin, and a sector of the Armed Forces appear to have favored the more gradualistic approach of the other Afghan communist faction, the Parcham, from which the present chief of state, Babrak Karmal, emerged.

About the end of 1979, with the exchange of shots between the two Khalq chiefs, Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, the Afghan catastrophe took on unexpected proportions. Two trips by the head of the Armed Forces' political leadership Epichef (the chief of the "political commissars" and a former member of the police who had been one of Suslov's inner circle since the physicians' conspiracy in 1952) were followed by the rather rapidly organized and somewhat improvised Christmas 1979 invasion. The invasion of Afghanistan, Brezhnev's last major policy decision, produced a convulsive shakeup within the collective leadership: Kosygin was removed from power, following his illness, and Chernenko and Andropov lost many of their prerogatives. One year later, Chernenko was named Brezhnev's unofficial heir apparent, and Tsvigoun Andropov's. Suslov had won on all fronts. For a while. The extent of the difficulties being encountered on the terrain, the discontent being manifested, sincere or orchestrated by Andropov, by its allies, from Cuba to Hungary, the USSR's international isolation, and finally, beginning in the spring of 1980, the intensity of the strikes in Poland, upset dramatically the balance of forces in Moscow itself.

The sequel is known: The return of Andropov, the elimination of Tsvigoun, the death of Suslov, and the strengthening of the military leadership's wing that is hostile to the Afghan war. On the day of Brezhnev's death, the Salang tunnel incident in which almost 1,000 Soviet soldiers died reminded the USSR's population that the dirty war was not near to being over.

Straightaway, Andropov used the war to attack his adversaries: Whereas under Brezhnev, operations were conventionally reported as police actions, now, the columns of KRASNAIA ZVERDA and LITGAZETA reported the sacrifice of such and such an officer, the severity of the fighting. Concurrently, Soviet

diplomacy now began placing a high value on the mission of Perez de Cuellar's UN and, with the tacit support of China, began a very dramatic overture toward the regime of Pakistan's Zia-ul-Haq, without, however, withdrawing its support of former President Bhutto's partisans.

Andropov thus scored two points against his adversaries: He made it plain to the Soviet people and to world opinion that he had not been responsible for the decision to invade Afghanistan, but that, the wrong having been done, he was seeking a negotiated solution. In signing a truce with Mas'ud covering the entire Panjshir Valley, Andropov succeeded in converting a local reversal into a major political victory as seen abroad: By manipulating the interests of opposing tribes, he had succeeded in rendering more credible the option that France, for its part, had labeled a mere "war-rimers' peace." Concurrently, Soviet diplomacy, which, under the influence of Suslovian theories, had woefully underestimated the Islamic phenomenon, underwent a dramatic moderated revision, the management of which is still being headed by Khaidar Aliev and which had already stemmed the flow of Egyptian arms to the resistance.

Today, with its new leadership seeking a military victory, alienating China and Pakistan, and having had to sell some highly sophisticated weapons to India, the USSR is not likely to profit greatly from the situation, either in the near term or the long term. With the landing of Soviet marines in Vietnam, in the form of joint maneuvers, the cycle is now complete: Andropov's China card has been liquidated.

What will happen now to the European card?

[Boxed editorial by Francois Sergent: "The Bear, the Paving Stone of Dung, and the Gnat"[*] follows]:

With respect to Chad, it was said that France had taken on a Vietnam to match its means. With Afghanistan, the USSR also appears to have found a Vietnam made to its measure. Of course, the Soviet expeditionary force is not as large as was the American contingent in Indochina, the Red Army's losses are also very much smaller than were those of the U. S. Army, and, as far as is known, the Soviet media and public opinion have not unhinged the Kremlin. According to numerous attestations, however, the Red Army, faced by an elusive enemy in mountains it knows by heart, is not performing at its best.

Like the GI's, the youngsters of the Red Army have vague yearnings, and the mujahidin do not hesitate to sell them Afghan hashish at a cheap price. Their dreams take them back to the banks of the Volga and they forget the Panjshir. Worse yet, Andropov's and Chernenko's poor GI's don't have the massage parlors of Saigon or Bangkok to help provide them with rest and recreation. Militarily, no Soviet base is totally secure or totally defensi-

[* An allusion to La Fontaine's fables "The Bear and the Gardener" and "The Lion and the Gnat"].

ble against attacks, and for this latest offensive, Soviet strategists had to send over their bombers from an air base located on Soviet territory. And the Red Army has decided to accelerate the rate of rotation of its troops.

Against these addling tactics, Andropov had decided to respond in kind, and, applying the old technique of his motherhouse the KGB, had succeeded in distilling the poisons of disunity within a resistance that was easy prey to his maneuvers. His successor appears to have turned up his nose at these sophistications and to have decided to smash the Afghans' head in at whatever price. This latest offensive, the seventh since the invasion, however powerful, however well-prepared it may be, appears to be signaling a case of jangled nerves on the part of the Soviets, who are being kept in check by a few ill-shod, bearded mountaineers armed with captured materiel.

But the harrassed bear is even more clumsy than usual. His blows hurt, hurt badly at times, but his victories on a totally hostile terrain risk being little more than ephemeral. And one has the impression that, this time, the USSR is no longer all that certain that time is working against the resistance.

It is a resistance that has learned a lot in 4 years and has spawned new chiefs who are more presentable and effective than the old feudal ones of yore. A resistance that knows also how to attract international recognition. One must, of course, avoid selling a bearskin before having killed the bear, but from Algeria to Vietnam the superpowers must, for their part, learn to beware of gnats.

Mas'ud's Panjshir Objectives

Paris COOPERATION in French 2 May 84 p 4

[Article by Jean-Jose Puig]

[Text] The Panjshir, the Mecca of Afghan resistance, and Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, chief of the rebellious valley, have come to symbolize the Afghans' resistance to the occupiers of their country. To reason from this, however, that the entire future of this resistance will depend on the outcome of the current new Soviet offensive would be rushing things considerably. Although no reliable information is available to us at this time as to the course of the fighting, the action can nevertheless be placed in a realistic strategic context and our assessment of the aims of both sides brought up to date.

First of all, as regards the resistance, one need only refer to the remarks made to us by Mas'ud in November 1983, which differed very little from those he had voiced to us in November 1980. His objective, since the beginning of the war, has been to transform the northeastern fourth of Afghanistan into a citadel of the resistance. For this, he would have to have at his disposal the innumerable sanctuaries available in the extremely rugged, hilly terrain of the region and open a multitude of operational fronts to

sever and disrupt the occupier's logistics: Essentially, the road from Kabul to the USSR, the one from Kabul to Pakistan, and the northeast road, the one from Qonduz to Fayzabad, the last sizable base in northeastern Afghanistan. These fronts, under local control of the most solidly based party and federated under a single military command, would be able to carry out coordinated actions while the civilian administration was being organized to endure a war of long duration. The attainment of these objectives would require a mammoth effort, as much with respect to the civilian population, whose acceptance would have to be won, as with respect to the political parties, whose mutual antagonisms, sharply exacerbated as they were by Soviet manipulations, would have to be softened. This effort would have to encompass at least eight provinces: Badakhshan, Takhar, Qonduz, Baghlan, Parvan, Kapisa, Laghman and Konar.

A Small-Scale Model of the Resistance

Using the Panjshir, therefore, Mas'ud proceeded to build a kind of small-scale model of this citadel of the resistance, without, however, having been able to transform it into a full-scale model, since the Soviets had allowed him no respite, until the end of 1982. It was around that time (January 1983) that the truce with the Soviets was agreed, providing Mas'ud an ideal opportunity to further the realization of his objectives. Almost immediately, he took over control of the region of Andarab (province of Baghlan) to put a stop to inter-party hostilities, and the Hezb-i Eslami agreed to cooperate with the Jam'iat Eslami, Mas'ud's party. Andarab was organized on the same model as the Panjshir, enabling restoration of communications with the Jam'iat of the province of Qonduz for the purpose of reorganizing bases and fronts in that region with the cooperation of the other parties.

Then, in the spring of 1983, Mas'ud sent a delegation, backed by some 100 resistance fighters, to restore order in the Flakhar Valley (province of Takhar), where some dissidents among the local population and the resistance were beginning to surface. The local population welcomed this initiative and agreed to the war contribution asked of it. The local chiefs responsible for the disorder, as well as the parasites, were disarmed and exiled to Pakistan; at the same time several training centers were set up in the upper valleys of the Hindu Kush. The resistance in the province of Badakhshan was then reorganized so as to coordinate military operations between the two provinces along the northern route.

Concurrently, talks got under way with the commandants of the different parties operating in the provinces of Kapisa, Laghman and South Konar, southeast of the Panjshir, there again to coordinate military operations and try to ensure the security of certain supply routes. The mobile groups of the Panjshir were sent into the regions of Paghman, Istalef and Ghorband (west and southwest of the Panjshir) to organize military operations along the road between Kabul and Salang, and to train the local residents.

Junction Made With Other Regions

Around the end of summer, the resistance organization of the Panjshir entered into contact with the resistance fighters of the regions west of the Kabul-USSR axis, and a meeting with Zabialheh--commandant of the Jam'iat Eslami in the Hazar-e-Sharif region--redefined the strategic objectives of the resistance in the north-central sector (provinces of Samangan-Balkh-Jouwzjan, Bamyian). Periodic talks between Mas'ud and Ismael Khan--commandant of the Jam'iat in the region of Herat--were aimed at achieving gradually the junction between the north-central resistance and that of the northwest, via the provinces of Faryab and Badghis. Twice toward the end of 1983, Mas'ud left the Panjshir to make a tour of the northern and north-eastern sectors for a first-hand survey of the evolution of the situation from the organizational standpoint, but also to become known to and recognized by the civilian populations. At this point (November 1983), Mas'ud placed the Panjshir Valley under his second in command, Abdul Hay, and told us: "Now, the Panjshir has again become another front like any other. We will do our best to hold it when the Soviets attack us again, but if the valley should fall, our order of battle will not be all that affected."

Mas'ud Used the Truce to Advantage

It should be added that throughout the summer of 1983, paralleling these initiatives on the part of Mas'ud, Panjshir received messages and delegations from other fronts and other parties spontaneously offering to cooperate and to place themselves under Mas'ud's orders.

It can be said, therefore, that from the very beginning Mas'ud had a clear and precise idea of exactly what he had to do, and that he made good use of the truce with the Soviets, to try to prepare the future, all while reducing the Panjshir's pivotal importance.

As for the Soviets, this new offensive, with the extent of the means committed to it, confirms beyond all doubt the importance Mas'ud has attained. In addition, it removes all suspicions in his regard to which the recent truce might have given rise. But this offensive also marks a new change in Soviet strategy. Whereas in 1983 military activity was toned down in favor of a more politically oriented conduct of the war, the year 1984 has started with a Soviet war effort of an intensity unequalled since 1980.

It would appear that suddenly the Soviets are no longer entirely convinced that time is working exclusively in their favor. Is this because their attempted subversive truce with Mas'ud did not yield the expected result? Is it because the sophistication of the "Andropovian" strategy--infiltration of the resistance in the field by the Khad, pacification of the civilian society and selective reprisals against too openly rebellious villages--is no longer in fashion under Chernenko? Is it because of the diplomatic

dimension the resistance is beginning to take on through the intermediary, among others, of Rabboui, head of the Jam'iat Islami, observer for the resistance at the Islamic Conference of Casablanca, and received officially in Paris by the secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay?

The answers to these questions matter little at this time, but it does appear that the initial result of this new way of dealing with the Afghan problem on the part of the Soviets is to provoke a unified reaction among the parties of the resistance at Peshawar (Pakistan), capital of the refugees and of the resistance movements, but also throughout the Afghan territory. The Afghans had practically forgotten that their principal enemy was the Soviet Union. The latter has just provided them a timely reminder.

[Boxed insert by B. B. follows]:

A 150-Km Transverse Valley Along the Panjshir

Islamabad (from our correspondent)--At 65 km northeast of Kabul, the Panjshir River forms a 150-km transverse valley that cuts across the Hindou Koush mountain range. It constitutes, after the Salang highway (Kabul-Mazar-e-Sharif), the second largest access route to the north of the country, linking Kabul with high plateaus of the fertile Radakshan Valley, which is irrigated by the Panjshir River and in normal times is agriculturally self-sufficient. Surrounded by the mountains of the Hindou Koush, protected on the south by a narrow pass that is well suited to ambushes, and criss-crossed by adjacent valleys providing east-west access, the Panjshir is an ideal terrain for the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

The cultural level of its inhabitants (around 100,000 peasants belonging, for the most part, to the Tadjike ethnies) is relatively high for a rural zone, owing to close contact with Kabul, where there is a large Pandjshiri community. Mas'ud is a typical example.

Since the Soviet invasion of December 1979, the Panjshiri have endured six massive offensives, which have been successfully repulsed by Mas'ud and his men. After the one of autumn 1982--which was accompanied by intensive aerial bombardments of the villages and which, using terror tactics, was aimed at dissuading the civilian population from protecting the mujahidin--the valley was destroyed and a large segment of its population compelled to leave. Thanks to the truce signed by Mas'ud the following winter, the population was able to return to the valley, rebuild its villages and return to farming. Local resistance is now better organized in the Panjshir than anywhere else. The resistance has created a military and civilian infrastructure, an administrative structure complete with dispensaries, schools and Islamic courts of law.

In launching their 21 April offensive against the Panjshir, the Soviets will once again be trying to shatter the prime symbol of the resistance. This

time, there will be no civilian victims. Forewarned by his agents in Kabul's government circles, Mas'ud last month evacuated the Panjshir's civilian population.

Media Restrictions

Paris LIBERATION in French 2 May 84 p 5

[Article by Beatrix Baconnier [spelling of surname as published]]

[Text] Since the closing of the country to the noncommunist press, information is received, for the most part, through Pakistan. Information is received from all sources, ranging from "Western sources" to those of the resistance, but it is skimpy, inaccurate and often outdated.

Islamabad (from our correspondent)--Since the Soviet intervention in December 1979 and the quasi total closing off of the country to the noncommunist press, it is essentially out of Pakistan that the day-to-day "coverage" of this war without winners or losers must flow.

Three main sources enable the press agencies and the very scarce radio correspondents (BBC and VOICE OF AMERICA) and newspaper correspondents to report rapidly the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan: In Islamabad, the famed "Western diplomatic sources"; in Peshawar, the Pakistani border city where the general headquarters of the mujahidin are located, the "sources close to the resistance" and the "resistance spokesmen"; and lastly, RADIO KABUL, the official Afghan radio station, whose information bulletin is listened to every night by the journalists.

The "Western diplomatic sources" are in fact the weekly "briefings" by the two principal Anglo-Saxon embassies, who refuse to be identified. In these embassies, under the portraits of Ronald Reagan and of Queen Elizabeth, the diplomats read to reporters the texts of telegrams sent by their colleagues stationed in Kabul, summarizing and interpreting in their own way the reports on the war that they have gathered and checked during the week. This practice, harking back to the Americans' Saigon "briefings" during the Vietnam War, aims essentially, for their initiators, to keep Afghanistan in the news. The Western powers, in effect, fear that the Afghan conflict could fade from the public mind, which obviously would do wonders for the Soviet Union's international image. In order to attain the widest possible circulation through the media, the "diplomatic dispatches from Kabul" are also read to the Western press at New Delhi, where the journalistic community is larger.

The second easily accessible source is the resistance components in Peshawar. In 4 years, the principal parties have definitely understood the value of propaganda, even though the extraordinary exaggeration of their reports

has partially nullified their credibility. "If all the Soviet soldiers killed by the victorious bulletins of the parties in Peshawar were to be summed up, the Red Army would long ago have been annihilated," observed bitterly a "special correspondent" in Peshawar flabbergasted by the figures on "enemy" losses being handed out by the resistance sources. Fortunately, some Afghans have understood that this kind of propaganda does them a disservice and have set up information offices to provide far more plausible reports on the military situation. The habitués of Peshawar learn little by little to distrust "scoops" furnished them all too complacently, and cultivate friendships with the "commandants" coming in from the interior, the party leaders and truck drivers, businessmen, merchants and other Afghan courriers who travel between Kabul and Peshawar.

For those with the time and the desire to obtain detailed information on the Afghan crisis, the sole means is to travel around the country itself with the maquisards. The free-lance reporters, the Afghanistan "specialists," like Frenchmen Olivier Roy, Jean-Jose Puig and Alain Guillo, who return each year to the country, bring back priceless analyses that provide the essential background for the day-to-day coverage of the war.

Physicians, for the most part French, and the volunteers with the different humanitarian organizations, also return from their missions in the Afghan rural areas with reports worthy of credence, which quite often contradict the peremptory statements of the diplomats and of the resistance sources, such as: Kandahar has fallen into the hands of the maquisards, or, Herat is three-fourths destroyed by bombs.

Babrak Karmal's government doles out visas in dribblets to enter Kabul, where the journalists are incessantly escorted and their investigative work unavoidably monitored, and even censored where film footage or photos are involved.

Reportage effected in the interior of the country has the advantage of being trustworthy, provided the reporter does not let himself be hoaxed by his escorts. It has the major flaw of being too partial, in that what is occurring in the valley the reporter has covered may be very different from the situation prevailing in a neighboring valley, the Afghan society being as segmented as it is. Furthermore, the reports resulting from these trips portray a situation that is quite often outdated by the time they are published. Thus, coverage of the Afghan war has the misfortune of being either outdated with respect to the actual date of the event, or imprecise where immediacy is desired. "However,"--explains a Frenchman "close to the resistance" in Peshawar--"what counts in the final analysis is that those whose faces are being bashed in by the bombs are the Afghans, and this must not be forgotten."

[Boxed insert follows]:

Afghanistan as Seen by a Soviet Periodical

How does one go about lulling his son to sleep when one is a Soviet army officer in Afghanistan, on home leave for a few days only with his family?

KRASNAIA ZVEZDA, organ of the Soviet Defense Ministry, provides a good answer, citing the example of Major Sergei Aksenenko, who commands a battalion somewhere in the mountains near Kabul.

"Listen now, my son. Our enemies have started hating our 3rd Battalion. They are unhappy because poor Afghans come to us every day for help or for advice. These people have no real love for us. Our doctor has treated Afghan children. We have participated in the construction of a dam in the village; we have arranged for tractors." "Sleep, my son," the major concludes, after having recounted to his little son Alexei the heroic death of Second Lieutenant Vitaly Seleznev, the glory of his battalion.

Alexei should be proud of his father, for, the 3rd Battalion is an exemplary unit.

"Thanks to you, 3rd Battalion. You have accomplished something on Afghan soil beyond mere military exercises."

More on Mas'ud, Panjshir

Paris LIBERATION in French 2 May 84 p 6

[Article by Beatrix Baconnier: "'Commandant' Mas'ud: The Lion of the Panjshir"]

[Text] Mas'ud has been dead since the start of the Soviets' seventh offensive in the Panjshir Valley on 21 April, according to an official Afghan source. Afghan resistance circles refuse to believe it. Six times now, in each of the preceding offensives, the Afghan government has announced the death or the capture of "Commandant" Ajmad Shah Mas'ud, when, in fact, the latter had effected a rapid withdrawal of his mujahidin into the mountains.

Mas'ud's military successes, which have now become legendary under the title "The Lion of the Panjshir," have made of the valley he commands the bastion of the Afghan resistance. At around 30 and of medium build, Mas'ud, who prefers fatigue dress and the flat wool hat of the Nouristanis to the "chapan" and to the turban, has neither the age nor the bearing of a traditional chief.

Son of an Afghan army officer who had served under Zahir Shah and under Daoud before taking refuge in Pakistan, Mas'ud could use his title of engineer, having studied for many years in the College of Sciences after graduating from the Lycee Francais Istiqlal of Kabul. His knowledge of the French language undoubtedly accounts for the presence of numerous French physicians in the Panjshir, where humanitarian aid is the most unflagging.

A Moslem deeply devoted to his faith, open to foreign ideas through his education, a reader of Mao and of Guevara, he is the only commandant to have mustered a truly professional resistance army. He has made full-time, well-equipped and well-armed soldiers of his mujahidin. Discipline is strict: Anyone caught smoking hashish is thrown into prison.

An acknowledged military chief, "Commandant" Mas'ud has also revealed himself an excellent administrator. In the Panjshir, he is referred to by the title of "amir," the title accorded to the governors of the provinces prior to the April 1978 coup. Under his prodding, civilians and maquisards have dug underground shelters to protect weapons and human lives. The creation of hospitals, prisons and tribunals in the valley has multiplied over the past 4 years. For, this young progressive chief belies the image of the illiterate, anachronistic warrior with which the mujahidin has, somewhat hastily, been identified.

Mas'ud political leaning is toward an Islamic and modernist Afghan state. Referred to as the "Afghan Tito" by some journalists, he is also convinced that the regime that is to be installed in Kabul after the defeat of the communists must maintain good relations with Afghanistan's Soviet neighbor.

His charisma, the prestige he has enjoyed among the civilian population and the maquisards and which, after 4 years of war, has spread far beyond the Panjshir, have not suffered in the least as a result of the truce, despite its controversiality, he signed with the Soviets at the end of 1982. The fact is that the sixth offensive launched against the Panjshir maquisards in November 1982 had left a cadaverous valley. Mas'ud therefore agreed to cease all attacks against the Soviet-Afghan base at Anawa, which controls the southern approach to the valley, and against the air base at Bagram, north of Kabul. In return, he received financial aid from the Afghan government to reconstruct the valley. This respite actually enabled Mas'ud to reorganize his army and to create "mobile groups" for the purpose of carrying on combat outside the Panjshir. But above all, he had to use the truce to unify the "resistance in the interior" in the northeast sector of the country and bridge over the quarrels and intrigues among the parties based in Peshawar, Pakistan.

The "Panjshir truce" ended on 21 April. Mas'ud had been expecting this for several months. In his last letter received to date by his party 2 weeks ago in Peshawar, he predicted the imminence of the offensive, stating that he himself had just escaped two assassination attempts organized by the Afghan secret services operating under Soviet control. Eight days later, Mas'ud's men took the bull by the horns, blowing up several bridges along the Salang highway to slow the advance of Soviet reinforcements.

(See also [JPRS related item "Media Restrictions" above]).

9238

CSO: 4619/46

NATION BROADENS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH INDIA

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 2 May 84 p 2

[Text] Tehran--Iran and India seemed set to further broaden bilateral economic relations with present trade estimated at \$1.6 billion up from \$100 million six years ago.

Iranian Commerce Minister Hassan Abedi Ja'afari arrived in New Delhi on Monday evening heading a high-ranking economic delegation aimed at increasing economic ties between India and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In a talk with reporters, Ja'afari said trade between the two countries had increased dramatically, reaching \$1.6 billion in 1362 (March 1983-84) from only \$100 million six years earlier.

He said Iran's main export to India was oil while India's exports to Iran were textiles, tea, petrochemical products and industrial equipment.

However, the Iranian commerce minister also said the quality of goods exported by some Indian companies were lower than international standards and were an obstacle in further expansion of trade.

One of the aims of the visit was to remove these obstacles, he said.

He said Iran and India were strong strategic nations and the strengthening of relations between the two could have a great influence in the region.

Iran's Minister of Commerce Hassan Abedi Ja'afari yesterday announced readiness of the Islamic Republic for meeting oil and petrochemical needs of India.

Speaking in a meeting with his Indian counterpart, Vishwanath Pratap Singh, Abedi Ja'afari proposed that a "harmonizing committee" be formed to follow up the bilateral cooperation.

The Indian minister also conveyed willingness of his country to cooperate with the Islamic Republic in transportation and communications fields as well as in petrochemical production.

The commerce minister was to meet India's Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao yesterday. Ja'afari arrived here Monday heading a political and economic delegation.

CSO: 4600/552

TURKISH PREMIER: 'NEW CHAPTER IN IRAN, TURKEY RELATIONS'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 2 May 84 p 1

[Text] Tehran--Prime Minister Turgut Ozal of Turkey wound up a four-day official visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran and said he believed a new chapter had been opened in mutual relations between the two countries.

A special Turkish jet flew the Turkish premier yesterday morning to Ankara's Esenboga Airport where he was met by newsmen on arrival, a cable dispatch from Ankara said.

Ozal told newsmen he hoped that trade with Iran may reach the \$3 billion mark by the end of the year.

"We believe we have opened a new chapter in our mutual relations," Ozal said.

The Turkish premier was accompanied on his Iranian trip by more than 200 businessmen and industrialists.

Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musavi of the Islamic Republic summing up the results of the visit of the Turkish delegation headed by Premier Ozal, said talks were held on political issues including the Iraqi imposed war although the major discussions centered around economic issues.

Musavi was reported by IRNA yesterday to have said that Turkey will purchase 6 million tons of oil from Iran next year.

He said that bilateral trade is expected to be around \$2.5 billion and there were possibilities for increases on this amount. He added that of this amount \$758 million were from Iran's purchases from Turkey, \$200 million transport costs on goods and \$1.2 billion Turkey's oil imports from Iran.

The Turkish prime minister was reported by IRNA to have said that new agreements between the two countries includes provision for Turkish sales of iron, sugar and wheat to Iran. Ozal expressed interest on behalf of Turkey in the termination of the Iran-Iraq war, IRNA said. "If there is something Turkey could do, it will be more than willing to help," Ozal reportedly said.

An invitation to the Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musavi to visit Turkey was extended by the Turkish Premier before his departure, the IRNA report said.

CSO: 4600/553

NVOI COMMENTS ON ATTACKS AGAINST OIL TANKERS

TA182006 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 18 May 84

[Unattributed commentary: "Is So Much Sacrifice and Devastation Not Enough?"

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: The prolongation of the imposed war of attrition by rulers of the Islamic Republic has confronted not only our homeland and nation but also the nations and states of the region with a serious and dangerous crisis.

The hegemonistic and ambitious policy of the Islamic Republic's rulers--which usually is manifested in the speeches and sermons of their mouthpieces, such as Messrs Khamene'i and Rafsanjani--has aggravated the situation and has caused the execution of a series of dangerous acts, including attacks on and bombardment of the oil tankers of the countries of our region in the Persian Gulf. Recently, attacks on and bombardment of the oil tankers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the Persian Gulf have escalated tension in the region, and caused reaction by Western countries, particularly the United States and Britain, who are seeking a pretext and an excuse to intervene and escalate their military presence.

In the aftermath of America's military threats since the day of the revolution's victory and until now, the warships of the United States and of its British and French allies in NATO have actually encircled the Persian Gulf. The war of attrition between our country and Iraq and its prolongation, and the persistence and doggedness of rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue the war at any price, have in practice assisted world-devouring America to implement the old plan, that is, to deploy its military forces in the Persian Gulf, escalate its military presence in this region, and interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of the Persian Gulf region should the plundering interests of international imperialism deem advisable.

Amid all this, the policy of rulers of the Islamic Republic, and the statements, speeches, sermons, and press interviews of the Islamic Republic's senior figures--made here and there without any control and without any sense of government responsibility and in an unbridled and unrestrained manner--are noteworthy. A brief review of the statements of the mouthpieces and spokesmen of the Islamic Government, particularly of Messrs Khamene'i and Rafsanjani in the last few months, makes one thing clear to everyone, that is, these gentlemen by their statements, want deliberately and intentionally to send an invitation to America and its allies. [Passage omitted citing Friday prayer sermon by Rafsanjani]

The meaning of this treacherous policy, those irresponsible remarks, and measures by the Islamic Republic's rulers is a public invitation to U.S. imperialism and its allies who have sharpened their teeth to restore their plundering positions. A bunch of discredited rulers, afflicted with the mental disease of ambitious hegemonism, should not be allowed to destroy Iran and the Iranians. The way to end current tensions in the Persian Gulf is not muscle-flexing or hollow and childish threats or declarations of war on the world. The people condemn this treacherous policy. The people justly regard the way to salvation out of the present situation as an honorable peace and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. In order to prevent the implementation of the destructive policy of a government that enforces the policy favored by imperialism, the people see no way other than struggling against this government.

CSO: 4640/234

TEHRAN ARABIC COMMENTS ON U.S. INTENTIONS IN GULF

GF201619 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 20 May 84

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpt] Washington is talking about the Gulf crisis in the language of one who owns the region. Statements have been made by the vice president, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of state, [words indistinct], the executive organ for the U.S. aggressive plots.

George Bush found himself forced to leave Pakistan and stand on the shore of the Strait of Hormuz to tell the world and the friends of the United States in Europe that the United States will not allow any interruption in shipping in this waterway.

Caspar Weinberger was forced to cut short his talks with Hassan ii on the Sahara and direct his eyes toward the waters of the Persian Gulf, which is full of events, and to say that Washington is closely watching the developments of the crisis and is preparing plans for (?future) possibilities. [Passage indistinct]

What is new in the U.S. move of alertness is that it has reached its peak and gone from statements to action on all levels. For the first time, Washington has put all of its weight into the issue. While Bush's mission to Oman was to prepare military operations for the expected possibilities near the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, Weinberger's mission was to get the Moroccan regime to agree to the U.S. request to be able to use Moroccan bases in the event of danger in the Persian Gulf region, danger which will threaten U.S. interests. Weinberger ended his mission by sending a Moroccan military delegation on his behalf to Baghdad to hold talks with Iraqi rulers on the current crisis.

On the other hand, the Pro-U.S. regimes quickly met and agreed to blame the Islamic Republic for being responsible--according to their claims--for what is happening in the Gulf arena so as to move the issue to the Arab Foreign Ministers Conference in Tunis and subsequently to the corridors of the Security Council. Despite U.S. assurances, Washington's efforts are purely diplomatic. These efforts imply that for all the developments, there is yet another purpose of wider proportion than diplomacy which completely concurs with the statements

of the former CIA director under Carter. He called on Washington and its allies to declare war on the Islamic Republic in Iran for being the center of tension in the vital region of U.S. and European interests. If we view this statement together with the military concentrations near the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz and the fact that U.S. military experts have installed anti-aircraft missile batteries along the Gulf coastline of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, we can say that Washington is preparing for military action which will compensate it for its heavy losses in Lebanon or gain votes for Reagan in the upcoming elections. But regardless of what Washington thinks, dreams or decides, it will not escape the fact that it is in the most critical historical point. Silence will add to its obscurity and screaming will lead to [words indistinct] and perhaps the dream of involvement will lead to a certain point which the U.S. decision will face the unknown.

The Persian Gulf region is not lined with silk for the U.S. forces to walk upon, nor is it planted with flowers to be thrown at the marines and other invading forces. Yesterday, Washington discovered in Lebanon what the price of aggression is. The price it will pay will be much higher if it tries its luck in other parts of the Islamic world. And that price will be the highest possible, if the aggression is made against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yesterday, the millions who participated in Friday prayers throughout the country announced that they are ready to confront any U.S. aggression. [Passage omitted]

CSO: 4604/23

POWER TO COST MORE; WORLD BANK RECOMMENDS RATE INCREASE

Kathmandu THE MOTHERLAND in English 1 May 84 pp 1, 4

[Text] The World Bank is putting pressure on Nepal for raising the price of electricity by a minimum of 85 percent, according to a reliable source.

If the price of electricity consumption is raised on the basis of the World Bank's recommendation, per unit cost of power consumption will come to Rs 1.30 compared to less than 85 paisa at present.

The World Bank is insisting on raising the price of power consumption in order to make the loan for the Marsyangdi project effective.

The World Bank has already pledged 100 US dollars for the 66 megawatt Marsyangdi project.

Saudi Fund for Development has agreed to provide 25 million US dollars for the project.

The project is estimated to cost about 325 million dollars and is thus considered to be one of the costliest hydro power projects.

Soon after the completion of Kulekhani hydropower station, the government had raised the price of electricity by 58 percent.

The proposed price hike is under the active consideration of the government and what remains to be seen is whether the price recommended per unit consumption of power will be raised all at a time or in a phased manner.

In any case the hike in the price of electricity to be affected on the recommendation of the World Bank will be at least twice the amount of the cost of power in India.

The preliminary construction works at the proposed site were initiated in 1982 with the objective of completing it in the fiscal year 1985-86, a target which may be left far behind if the recommendation of the World Bank is not to be carried out.

AGREEMENT FOR GRANT FOR RURAL ELECTRIFICATION SIGNED

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 26 Apr 84 p 1

[Text]

United Nations Capital Development Fund (UN— is to provide Nepal an additional grant assistance of US\$ 0.986 million (about Rs. 1 crore 54 lakhs) to implement the rural electrification project.

An agreement to this effect. was signed here Wednesday between UNCDF and HMG.

Under this agreement UNCDF will provide foreign exchange cost of implementing five mini hydel plants at Bhojpur (250 kw), Khandbari (250kw), Okhaldhunga (125kw), Ramechhap (75 kw) and Taplejung (125 kw).

These plants are scheduled to be commissioned by December 1986.

According to a press release issued by Finance Ministry, UNCDF had already agreed in 1979 to provide US\$ 1.915 million grant assistance for the implementation of rural electrification project.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also provided US\$0.404 million (about Rs. 63 lakhs) technical assistance required for the implementation of the project, the press release said.

His Majesty's Govern-

ment will bear local cost of US\$ 2.223 million (Rs. 3 crore 79 lakhs) equivalent.

The agreement was signed by acting Secretary Lok Bahadur Shrestha in the Ministry of Finance and executive secretary of UNCDF Orlando Olcese.

His Majesty's Government of Nepal has expressed sincere appreciation to UNCDF for the assistance provided under this agreement and for continued cooperation for the economic development of Nepal.

Speaking at the signing ceremony acting Secretary Lok Bahadur Shrestha expressed the hope that the UNCDF assistance will, apart from providing electricity, also help promote industries in the remote areas.

Mr. Shrestha also commended the interest and assistance taken by UNCDF in the development of Nepal.

UNCDF executive secretary Orlando Olcese who also spoke on the occasion stated that providing energy in remote area is one of the basic needs and the assistance will be of help to meet such demands.

At the signing ceremony UNDP resident representative to Nepal T. Niwa was also present. (RSS)

COTTAGE, RURAL INDUSTRIES SAID 'KEY TO DEVELOPMENT'

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 1 May 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Key to Development"]

[Text]

The Assistant Industry Minister, Mr. Mukunda Bahadur Basnet, has rightly described cottage and rural industries as the "key to economic development" of the country. The Assistant Minister who was declaring open a two-day seminar on rural and cottage industries projects sponsored by the Rural and Cottage Industries Development Committee in Pokhara the other day also noted that the Industrial Policy of His Majesty's Government would make a favourable impact on this sector. Industrialisation is undoubtedly one of the main factors not only for lessening the burden on the agricultural sector, helping to curb imports and providing employment to the people, but also for helping the country and its people to embark on a truly modern path of development. There are two means of achieving industrialisation in the Kingdom: by undertaking many large scale industries and by encouraging villagers and local people set up cottage industries. The first course of action is beyond the means of the country either at the government level or at the private sector level. This might be possible through joint ventures but this would be limited in number and not likely to substantially alter the present economic pattern of the country. Hence, the alternative is to opt for cottage and rural industries which most people in the private sector can undertake with a little bit of dedication and hard work. His Majesty's

Government has been aware of this and as a result the Industrial Policy as well as the Industrial Act have sought to encourage industries at the local level. Moreover, there are credit agencies within the country which have been providing loans for taking up such industries.

His Majesty's Government's sincerity in encouraging cottage and rural industries is apparent from the provision under which such industrial ventures with a fixed capital of 500 thousand rupees or less and running capital of 20 thousand rupees or less are not required to get a licence. This has been done to do away with red tape and other delays that might discourage small investors, and indeed there are a number of government agencies now directly catering to the needs of those setting up cottage and rural industries. A loan from the World Bank is also helping in the setting up of such industries in the rural areas which are designed not only to produce exportable goods but also to provide employment opportunities to the local populace. The idea of encouraging cottage and rural industries is that this would lead to the setting up of such industries all over the country and thereby help in absorbing excess agricultural labour on the one hand, and help in reducing imports through the production of import-substitution goods. The government, in order to encourage these industries, has not only been liberal in granting of facilities such as income tax exemption but has also provided other measures such as import of raw materials with the minimum of formalities. The time is indeed opportune, therefore, for all desiring to do so to invest in these industries and thereby not only ensure themselves of a secure source of income and profits but also help the country's industrialisation.

LOSS OF ART TREASURES DISCUSSED, DECRIED

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 27 Apr 84 Friday Supplement p 5

[Article by George C. Alpen: "Going, Going, Gone..."]

[Text] It is a pity to see that at a time when nations strive to preserve their cultural heritage, Nepal, a country blessed with artistic wealth and beauty unparalleled in the world, is losing the most precious jewels of her past.

For many years Nepal has been a "paradise" for international art smugglers. Nepal's cultural and artistic wealth, a legacy of her rich heritage has been systematically plundered. Masterpieces of her living art have been literally torn out of temples and shipped to a booming collector's market in "developed" countries.

Painful experience: To see this well-organized art theft going on daily, apparently unhindered, is a painful experience for those of us who do not look at all upon Nepal as an "underdeveloped," but a highly civilized country, unique in the world as a fascinating focus of culture and religion, a treasure-house of spiritual knowledge and traditions to at have survived here, as if by a miracle, amidst a spreading world of dour and aggressive materialism.

For many countries Nepal has been an abode of the gods, famous for her holy shrines and numerous places of pilgrimage. The Kathmandu Valley in particular is a vibrant and living entity that still breathes the rhythm of the seasons. Despite the relentless and ever more intense onslaught of twentieth century "civilisation," the towns of Kathmandu Valley still exude their closeness to the land, and the soil that gives them life.

Kathmandu's gilded temples, stone shikaras and glistening pagodas are monuments that honour the land for being rich enough to sustain the community--a vivid expression of faith and peity of its ancestors.

Unique townscape: With amazement and enthusiasm stood and first foreign visitors at the sight of the Nepal Valley, face-to-face to its unbelievable wealth of art in a relatively small area--art not confined to a museum, but standing freely in the open, set amidst green hills, paddy fields and groves, in the compact ochre villages and at the riverbanks. The treasures of the past were not merely objet d'art created by unknown masters, but were part of the valley culture, visited and worshipped by the local population. Ever since, the

specific radiance of this unique urban townscape has proved to be the greatest attraction of Nepal--besides her high mountains. As Nepal opened to the outside world, Kathmandu's wealth became a veritable magnet to foreign visitors, who came in ever increasing numbers from all parts of the world to admire it.

It was, in fact, an attraction so rare that it is still incomparable to heritage sites elsewhere in the world. A wise policy of careful preservation of this beautiful environment would have laid solid foundations for a long-lasting showpiece for many generation to come.

Nepal could have become a classical example of a country where heritage and tourism both survive by helping to sustain each other. It could have rivalled Switzerland which has been successfully doing just this, Nepal could even surpass that country which is equally beautiful, but not blessed with such an abundance of art.

But Nepal seems to have chosen instead, the way of "instant tourism." She is selling out for short-term profit instead of preserving her wealth for posterity.

This "sell-out" has many faces: be it the pollution of the capital valley, the destruction of its natural environment, the neglect of her ancient monuments and temples, or the truly horrible "modern" cement architecture, whose monstrous ugliness is brutally wiping out the dignity and serenity of Kathmandu's unique urban atmosphere. But one of the worst aspects of cultural decay, is manifested in organised art theft which appears to be thriving in Kathmandu Valley.

No win: There is nothing that Nepal could win in this business. On the contrary, she is losing daily. In only 30 years--and particularly in the last 3 years--Nepal has suffered an enormous, and irreparable, cultural loss. It is safe to assume that in these 30 years, Nepal has lost already half of the art which her artisans took 2000 years to create.

Wherever you go in the valley, without exception on every sacred site, the ugly traces of art theft are clearly visible. Just a few examples of recent outrages.

--Last week, three beautiful images of Shiva Kamdeva at Mrigasthali Hill above Pashupatinath were wrenched out of their granite sockets. The three images have not been traced.

--At Bhim Dhara, west of Dattatreya Square in Bhaktapur, stood a 1,000-year-old stone idol of Lord Narayan, accompanied by Goddess Lakshmi and Garuda. This was an exceptionally valuable piece of superb craftsmanship. It was stolen in February 1984.

--For 900 years, a stone-carved idol of Lord Surya stood undisturbed in a small temple area in the fields east of Pharping, until it was stolen in March 1983.

--Until last year, one could admire a powerful statue of Shiva Kamdeva in black stone in the Rajeshvari Temple courtyard at Pashupatinath, showing the Mahadeva in his generative aspect. This image--standing to the left of the Uma-Mahesh vara idol at the same place--was also lifted from its pedestal. Today a small Shiva statute has been inserted in its place which does not fit into the gap left by the original. The trail of plunder left by these culture vultures is visible everywhere. Not one sacred place in the Valley is spared. [as published]

--The beautiful gilded Torana above the entrance to the Taleju Bhavani shrine in Mul Chowk in Patan had already been disgraced years ago. All the 10 statues of the gods have been stolen from its facade, which is totally empty now. All that remains is the pathetic sight of a pair of amputated golden feet of a diety still resting on a lion.

--From the Torana at the entrance to Bhimsen temple at Mangal Bazar in Patan, 5 of idols were snatched by thieves in January 1984.

At the Bagh Bhairav temple in Kirtipur, idol-lifters didn't bother to pick the statues separately--they simply carried away the entire Torana.

--18 of the 88 marvellous Tantric stone sculptures at the Royal Bath in Sundari Chowk, Patan, have been stolen. The remaining--each a masterpiece in its own right--would have vanished long ago had the place not been put under permanent guard. The beautiful composition of Lord Vishnu, Lakshmi and Garuda at the same place had to be ensnared in ugly iron rods, after the Makara waterspout on which the gods are seated, had been badly mutilated by thieves who wanted to hack it out.

--The frieze of the Narayan Temple in Chakrabahil, Patan, has been bereaved of most of its exquisite stone sculptures. A similar sacrilege is beginning now at the Vatsala Devi temple in Bhaktapur, and the first three stone idols have already vanished.

--At the Minantha Temple in Patan, seven out of 16 small brass figures on the entrance facade are stolen.

--There is not a single temple at Mangal Bazar in Patan, which has not suffered more or less severe losses in its woodcarved decorations, especially in the ornate wooden panels which decorate both sides of the doors.

--One month ago, Nasamana and Tekatso areas in Bhaktapur fell victim to an attack by art thieves, who stole: a) from the Varahi Temple the woodcarved image of the Goddess out of the center of the main Torana, b) from the Tekatso Ganesh Temple the gilded brass statues of Kumar, Ganesh and Kumari, c) the stone sculpture of Goddess Sarasvati, d) and from the Nasamana Ganesh Temple all the three woodcarved images from the Torana above the entrance. All in one night. None of the stolen artifacts were recovered.

One could go on and on recounting Nepal's treasures of art--all in the past tense. Except in rare instances, the works of art all vanish without trace. And still the plunder goes on:

--The remarkable Uma-Mahesvara idol of Lele village has been stolen, and so has that of Tribeni Ghat in Panauti.

--Stolen are the idols of Shaktishambar of Shri Bahal, Balkumari of Tyaga Tol, Surya of Tungal Tol, the Mani Fanesh of Mangal Bazar and the golden image of Lord Buddha of Imbahil locality in Patan.

--The idol of Shri Chandeshvari Bhagvati in Tokha was stolen in October 1983. The 18-armed, 56 cm high statue was believed to be 3000 years old! A reward of Rs 2000, which the Chandeshvari village Panchayat promised, has not helped in bringing back the image of the Goddess.

--The stone image of Lokeshvar that was stolen in Swayambhunath on March 2nd, 1984, was more than a meter in height and too heavy for four men to lift. Nevertheless, thieves carried it away, probably in a truck.

In chains: In vain, the people try to protect their dieties by fettering them in chains or in iron rods. Right now, the entire temple of the Seto Macchendranath in Jana Bahal, Kathmandu, is being fenced in with a huge iron lattice, because the complex has suffered such enormous losses by art thefts in recent years. More than a dozen precious gilded statues and an entire Torana have been stolen from its facade.

Thus, for the first time ever, Nepalis can see their gods "in jail" locked behind iron bars and cheap metal grills. But of course, measures such as these are not serious obstacles for well-equipped thieves.

One of the most precious statues in the whole of Bakhtapur was an idol of Lord Vishnu which stood in a shrine at Nasaman Tol. This sculpture in black polished stone, 95 cm high, depicted the unity of the male and the female by showing the male god on the right half of the figure and his consort Lakshmi as the left half of the same statue. A truly marvelous, and outstanding piece of art. It was stolen two months ago. Only a gaping hole in the wall now reminds us of the place where the god was venerated for more than 600 years till the day before which it was stolen. This image will probably never be seen again by any Nepali.

'Gold mine': These are only a few examples, the enumeration far from being complete. But even this fraction of information gives us an idea as to the extent of idol smuggling out of Nepal--which has turned out to be a "gold mine" for international art gangsters. What once was the most beautiful "living museum" in the world has today become a huge supermarket for art, where unscrupulous thieves and their masters can help themselves to what they fancy. A bizzare self-service marketplace.

Half of it is already gone. The remaining half is still very much worth preserving. But there can be no doubt that if the art theft business is allowed to continue, by the turn of the century Nepal, with the exception of a few temples, will be stripped clean of her most valuable cultural possessions. And this business will continue, if drastic measures are not taken immediately to root out an evil where greed drives men to steal objects of divine

worship. Otherwise the dead-serious prediction of the Nepali journalist Kunda Dixit, that not too many years hence Nepalis who want to make their sacred pilgrimage may well have to tour North America by visiting various museums where Nepali Vishnus, Saraswatis and Lakshmis are now found, may well come true.

Nepal is presently undergoing the most drastic social and cultural changes in her history. Changes which are reshaping values throughout the Kingdom, to its remotest corners. This is the reason why, for the time being, the majority of Nepalis are not longer able to see much value in the cultural heritage of their ancestors.

At a time when the gods are replaced by other objects of worship such as cars and videos, who will care for some old stone statues?

Inferiority: Having been told by foreign "experts" again and again that their country is "underdeveloped" a lot of Nepalis seem to have finally accepted this statement of inferiority. They have thus lost pride in their tradition, in their own cultural identity, being fascinated only by the seductive glitter of an alien civilisation, knowing nothing about the dark shadows behind shining facades of wealth, and the dangers of being hooked irreversibly onto materialism.

But it needs little foreknowledge to realise that there will come a time when all this excitement that is haunting Nepal now, will be gone and over.

Nepal, very much changed then, after having learned painful lessons--lessons as cruel as what is happening to her art now--will return to her roots, trying to rediscover her identity.

It will be then that what Nepal is losing now will be sorely missed. And only then will what is still left in this country be appreciated again as the genuine expression of the Nepali way of life.

No More

The shock of feeling her baby move for the first time filed Sita with anxiety. She rushed to her old step-aunt, who placated her and dispelled her fears with reassurances about the wonders of birth. To further help ease Sita's troubled mind, her aunt spoke of the 600 year old Lakshmi-Narayan image in Bhaktapur, Nasaman Tole, that granted and revealed the gender of the baby to be born.

This image, she explained, had been gifted to the ruling king of Bhaktapur, who had no heir, by a snake king as a boon for saving his life at the pond of 500 fishes (Nya-su-muna). Since then, expecting mothers would go to this image of half Narayan and half Lakshmi, explained the nanny, and after ritual prayers they would pour oil down the forehead. If the oil trickled down the breast of Lakshmi, a daughter would be born, and if the oil trickled down the chest of Narayan then most probably a boy would be born, she explained.

The next day, with her plate heaped with ritual offerings, Sita would set off for Bhaktapur. At Nasamana tole, she would be shocked to find only the scarred remains of a plastered wall where the image once rested. The image of Lakshmi-Narayan had been stolen the previous day.

No one knows where the image is, or who stole it. No more will the divine couple give solace to young Nepali mothers. Today, Lakshmi-Narayan probably adorns the spiritually sterile living room of a western connoisseur of 'art.' (BS)

CSO: 4600/550

POLITICS: CHANGE SAID 'AROUND THE CORNER'

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 26 Apr 84 p 9

[Article by Ayaz Amir: "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom"]

[Text]

THERE is no mistaking the new feeling in the air that a change is around the corner. It is not easy to put this mood into precise words but it is there.

It is built, firstly, on the recognition that the regime has gone so far in promising some sort of elections by March 1985 that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for it to pull back. It is built, secondly, on the atmosphere created by the steady release of political prisoners in Sind and the Punjab, including that veteran leader of many alliances, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. That this process could culminate in the release of the Tehrik leader, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, and the PPP big guns, like Mumtaz Bhutto and Mustafa Jatoi, is not without significance, for their entry into the political arena can be expected to hasten the pace of events. The third factor contributing to this feeling of spring is the relative liberty the print media is exercising in covering political resolutions and statements. (Covering political events is a different matter because very little is happening that could be classed under that head.)

Extraneous issues

General Zia-ul-Haq, it is true, has touched on a number of extraneous issues some of which clash quite openly with his self-proclaimed priorities. While this may indicate that the regime has still to make up its mind about the road it intends to follow, it could also denote a studied

ambivalence to keep his opponents guessing. But, whatever the case, the CMLA remains committed to set the ball rolling by March 1985. His remark, a few airport interviews ago, that he might contemplate cancelling the elections if the political parties took a joint stand against them was conditional upon holding a referendum on the issue. This does not detract from the promise of spring because in the present vacuum even a referendum would be something to talk about.

But while riding on this tide of optimism, it is as well to remember that the situation now unfolding is broadly similar to the one that existed in the country in the spring of 1979. Mr. Bhutto had been removed from the way, an election had been promised for November which the JUP, the Tehrik, and the parties of the Pakistan National Alliance, were planning seriously to contest. It could equally well be remembered that in the aftermath of Mr. Bhutto's hanging there were no curbs on the PPP, which was as free as any other political party. Musawaat was still carrying shrill banner headlines which may have been devoid of political content but at least served to keep alive the ardour of the faithful. If ever spring was around the corner it was then.

Tanks weren't needed

But when the necessity to blight that season of hope arose, the regime

needed no tanks to do it. A simple proclamation on October 16, 1979, sufficed to ban all the political parties, impose blanket restrictions on political activities and put the elections in a deep freeze from which they have yet to emerge. Not a whimper of protest was heard throughout the land.

It is crippling to remain a prisoner of the past but neither is it wise to forget its lessons completely. The regime's imperatives have not changed. It remains committed to a maximalist charter, whose salient feature — the introduction of Islam — brooks no interruption in the forward march of military rule. Circumstances, indeed, are not what they were in 1979. The intervening years have yielded a large crop of cynicism and despair. The Brownshirts of the Islami Jamiat are nursing a deep sense of grievance. While the Jamaat as a whole remains in two minds, other allies who loyally stood by the regime in those days have crossed over to the other side. But the changed circumstances have resulted only in a change of tactics; they have modified none of the old imperatives.

Mounting pressure

There is no denying the fact that the pressure for elections exists and that it is steadily mounting. It will tax the regime's ingenuity to dissipate it. In detention Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan seems to have cultivated a more militant style. Should Air Marshal Asghar Khan also be released, the political temperature could be expect-

ted to rise further. People are inclined to listen to what they have to say, for despite the fact that they represent no rising sun, prolonged detention has increased their stature and covered their heads with a halo of martyrdom.

But this pressure for elections, as long as it is confined to resolutions and newspaper statements, will not be enough to prise open a chink in the armour of Martial Law. To produce results it has to have behind it the united, sustained weight of the movement for democracy, not a babble of conflicting voices. And it has to develop the strength to mobilise the people so that when the time comes they would be able to indicate their preferences through forms of protest considered acceptable in democratic societies and at the same time whose meaning is impossible to mistake. Minus this ability, the MRD will remain a paper tiger.

Next winter's freeze

Should the regime, too, entertain a similar notion about the MRD, that its bark is worse than its bite, there will be little to prevent it from dashing the hopes that have arisen momentarily. It may have to pay a slightly heavier price this time but considering that the stakes are heavier than they were five years ago, that is not too much to ask. So long as the foreign policy front is static, so long in fact as Afghanistan continues to engage the active interest of the United States, it is illusory to expect any fundamental change in the imperatives at home. That being the case, the next winter's freeze should take no one by surprise.

RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS DENOUNCED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 26 Apr 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Press Laws"]

[Text]

THE BRIEF summary published of the Federal Shariat Court's judgement on a petition challenging the Press and Publications Ordinance, and some other restrictive laws, seems to offer a mere palliative as far as the Press laws are concerned. All provincial governments have been directed by the Court to make certain amendments in the offending law, because it is considered to be violative of the principles of freedom of expression upheld by Islamic codes. If this were to be done, it would certainly make the Press Ordinance's administration a little less arbitrary and its application a little more rational in certain matters. But, while awaiting availability of the judgement's full text, it is a little difficult to understand how the diagnosis made by the Court about the state of the Press, and the principles approved by it on the strength of the declaration of the Islamic Press Union, were found to be in consonance with the mild remedies it has prescribed. In accordance with the theories endorsed by the Court, it should have accepted the position repeatedly explained by leading organizations of journalists, namely, that, as in other countries where Press freedom is respected, newspapers should not be subjected to any special laws, except for simple regulatory rules, and that the Press should only be

bound by the ordinary law of the land administered by the courts of justice. To make the transition to the desired rule of law easier, Press organizations have put forward various compromise proposals; for example, the introduction of a Code of Ethics and the establishment of special Press Benches in the four High Courts to oversee that the Code is obeyed, or the creation of Press Councils. These measures are intended to help free the newspapers from their many shackles and allow the country to be served by a Press that is free enough to reflect genuine public opinion and sufficiently responsible to escape bureaucratic harassment and persecution.

As far as the Shariat Court's judgement is concerned, the Federal Government has, without an explanation of any sort, decided to appeal against it to the Supreme Court. Although it is not possible to anticipate the result of the appeal, it is quite possible that the Shariat Court judgement will be over-ruled or amended. In any case, if the Government remains determined to maintain the Press and Publications Ordinance more or less in its present form, this can easily be done by another Ordinance or a new Martial Law Regulation. On the other hand, during a meeting of selected editors with the CMLA and his advisers, it was made known

that a step forward had been taken in regard to the stalemated negotiations on Press freedom between the CPNE and the Government. A draft proposal that will pave the way for repeal of the black Ordinance, and provide for a less one-sided arrangement for guidance of the Press, has reportedly been finalized by the Information Ministry and sent to the CPNE President. If the draft is found acceptable by the editors' organization, it will then be vetted by various Federal ministries and presumably also by the provincial governments. If finally all the approvals required for its implementation can be obtained, and its final shape is found reason-

able and workable by the Press, the change demanded in the Press and Publications Ordinance since its first promulgation, and discussed over more than two decades, may be brought about. If the alternative arrangement can genuinely guarantee Press freedom, it will be a big day not only for the country's Pressmen but also for the nation as a whole. The Government, too, should realize that it will lose nothing by helping the resurrection of a free Press that can both guide and reflect the people's wishes and whose restored credibility can make it a clean two-way channel of communication between the Government and the people.

CSO: 4600/551

LETTER CRITICIZES U.S. 'ADVENTURES'

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 26 Apr 84 p 4

[Letter to Editor by Raza Ali, Islamabad]

[Text] Late in April 1979, the American military suffered a major setback when its adventurous attempt to 'rescue American hostages' in the Iranian desert Tabes failed. The United States had enlisted a big force and vast resources for the implementation of that act of aggression. A mock-up of several Tehran streets had been built in the California desert as a training ground for the American commandos and a nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier accompanied by several other warships had been sent to the southern coast of Iran.

Leaving most of his duties to his assistants, President Carter had assumed full control over the operation in Iranian airspace. The new republic estimated the cost of the operation at two billion dollars, but as HARPER'S MAGAZINE disclosed, the operation cost almost six billion dollars while the gain for 'U.S. prestige' was hardly worth six cents.

It turned out later that the 'rescue operation' was regarded by the Pentagon strategists and the Administration merely as a pretext for broader interference in Iranian affairs. The unit of specially trained commandos had the assignment to seize or destroy a number of government offices in Tehran and help an opposition group to stage a coup d'etat. It should be recalled that the operation failed only because of a number of unforeseen circumstances, such as a sandstorm, the breakdown of several helicopters, an error made by the pilot of the Hercules transport plane and several accidents on board the atomic aircraft-carrier where the fire-fighting system switched on by a false alarm sprinkled with foam the helicopters that were to carry the commandos.

The Americans' interest in Iran is quite understandable. Washington would not have staked its prestige and several billion dollars on the operation in the Iranian desert if it had not counted on a colossal payoff in the form of reinstatement of American influence and presence in Iran. It would be appropriate to recall here what the United States had lost as a result of the overthrow of its obedient servant, the Shah.

During the last six years of its existence, the Shah's regime had bought from the United States 19,000 million dollars worth of arms, all of which were

virtually under the Pentagon's control and were serviced by American specialists, ranking from private to General. In 1978 alone the Shah received 2,600 million dollars worth out of the total of 13,500 million dollars worth of American arms supplies to foreign countries. It was the Pentagon, not the Iranian chiefs of staff, that decided what types of armaments and ammunition and what amount should be supplied to Iran.

In that country situated far from the United States the Americans stockpiled weapons intended for use in aggression against other countries.

The United States also had considerable economic interest in Iran. Nearly 500 leading American industrial companies had their enterprises in that country. U.S. capital investments in Iran were estimated at more than 700 million dollars. Iranian banks owed the Wall Street 2,200 million dollars a year, while the Iranian market consumed 3,800 million dollars worth of American goods a year. No wonder the White House decided that such economic-military and political interests were worth the risk.

The Adventure in the Tabas desert has proved beyond doubt that Washington would resort to any act of gangsterism whenever and wherever its supremacy is at stake. The current situation in the Middle East region has also shown that it is actively preparing for new military adventures. This has created a threat not only to Iran but certain other countries in the troubled region of the Gulf. This state of affairs requires utmost vigilance on the part of all the peoples in Gulf region. Relating to the aforementioned situation we should also remain ready to meet any eventuality as we are in the backyard of this most strategic region.--Raza Ali, 66/1-D, F-6/1, Islamabad.

CSO: 4600/551

PRIVATE SECTOR OFFERS TO SET UP POWER PLANTS

Karachi DAWN in English 4 May 84 Business Supplement p 1

[Text]

KARACHI, May 3: The private sector has offered to set up 5 coal and oil-based power plants at Karachi and Dadu District to supplement public sector power generation and to meet the increasing power demand in the southern parts of the country.

This was disclosed by Mr Saifullah Khan Paracha, President, Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry while talking to PPI.

He said specific proposals in this regard are being processed and a number of important issues have been settled.

He said a committee headed by Mr Sher Mohammed Khan, Joint Secretary (Power) of the Ministry of Water and Power which met in Karachi on April 30 decided that the Government will take all power generated by private sector and offered to WAPDA or KESC with a minimum assured plant load factor of 60 per cent.

Mr Paracha also disclosed that each of the proposed plant shall not be of less than 25 megawatts capacity.

However, he said the price of electricity produced by the private sector plants has yet to be determined by the Government.

The committee which includes Mr Saifullah Khan Paracha, President, FPCC&I; Mr Faryad Malik, Senior Cost Accountant, WAPDA; Mr G.M. Ilias, Chief Engineer, Coal Project, WAPDA; and Mr Salim Akbar, Chief Engineer, KESC; discussed in detail ways and means of determining the tariff and plant factor of sale of power to WAPDA

and KESC by the private sector. Giving the background of the private sector proposals, Mr Paracha said following the policy decision taken by the Federal Government in early 1983 to open power generation to the private sector, at least 5 parties have come up with proposals.

These include proposals for setting up 3 coal-based power plants to be located between Jamshoro and Khanote in Dadu district. Sponsors include M/s Habibullah Mines, Dawood Group and Riay and Khalid.

The other two plants will be oil-based. One proposal is by Habib Group to set up a plant at Hab to meet the power requirements in that industrial area and other in Karachi by Pakland Energy Development.

He said the private sector sponsors were interested to know what price they will be paid and how much power the government will ensure to lift. Besides, he said sponsors of coal-based plants want that the price of power generated by them should include imported oil-fuel replacement value.

Mr Paracha said the private sector was also prepared to operate on the basis of 20 per cent assured return on total equity. He said this kind of arrangement already exists in the case of cement plants etc.

Replying to a question, he said the IFC, a world bank affiliate and a consortium of Pakistani banks will finance the private sector power plants and there was no dearth either of funds or of technical personnel.—PPI

MRD LEADER SAYS: 'WE DON'T SEEK ANY HELP FROM U.S.'

Karachi DAWN in English 4 May 84 p 2

[Text] Lahore, May 3: Khwaja Khairuddin, the MRD secretary-general, has said "we will not meet Mr George Bush when he comes here, not do we seek any help from the United States. These are my personal views but I think no other MRD leader would see Mr Bush either."

Khwaja Khairuddin, speaking at the "Tajzia" programme of the Lahore Press Club said today that the F-16 aircraft and other modern weapons could not save the country. "Only the people who have a say in the matters of State can save a country," he added.

He denied that there was any separatist movement in Sind but said if the people of the Punjab remained indifferent to national affairs, secessionist tendencies could emerge.

He agreed with Rao Rashid's proposal that the political leaders and workers from the Punjab should go to Sind to agitate for the release of political prisoners in that province. "This will heal many wounds," he added.

The Secretary-General of the MRD announced that the next round of the Alliance's campaign would be more organised and would be well-timed and the Government would not be able to withstand it. He said that the MRD would not accept any programme of elections "which are not held under the 1973 Constitution. We will not only oppose such elections but we will also ask the people to boycott them."

Khwaja Khairuddin said that elections should be held under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Answering a question, he said, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was contacting parties outside the MRD, and he was very capable for the job, "He is doing good work and it will produce good results," he said.

The MRD leader said, there was a change in atmosphere and those who were opposed to the MRD in the past were also beginning to see merit in its four-point programme. "We are not forcing political parties outside the MRD to join us. All that we want is that if they do not want to join us, they may

form a parallel alliance for the restoration of democracy because this is the only point on which all the political parties are unanimous. We can then launch a joint struggle for restoration of democracy and the supremacy of the 1973 Constitution."

Answering another question, he said, this was not the proper time to form an electoral alliance among parties having similar economic programmes. However, when it became reasonably certain that elections would be held under the 1973 Constitution, one could think about forging such alliances.

Khwaja Khairudin said he was personally in favour of national government for at least ten years after general elections. "This is necessary for purposes of national integration because in seven long years, Martial Law has created differences among the provinces and only a national government can remove inter-provincial misunderstandings."

Answering another question, Khwaja Khairuddin said, the MRD would consider in its next meeting to move the Supreme Court to review its decision in the Begum Bhutto case.

He told a questioner: "We are demanding elections in Pakistan so that we can have an elected government. The same is our policy for Afghanistan but we will not allow anybody to use our territory because we believe that Pakistan should remain strictly non-aligned."

On relations with Afghanistan, he said: "We have an Embassy in Kabul and they have one in Islamabad, and yet we are not ready for direct talks with the Karmal regime."

He charged that the Government was supporting the American cause. "We have to make a basic change in our foreign policy in such a fashion that we do not have to depend on others but can build our economy through self-reliance. Only by adopting such a policy we can survive," he concluded.

CSO: 4600/551

CHINESE RELIEF GOODS FOR REFUGEES

Karachi DAWN in English 5 May 84 p 11

[Text]

KARACHI, May 4: A relief consignment of medical equipment, medicines and tea for distribution among the Afghan refugees residing in NWFP and Baluchistan was on Thursday handed over by the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan, Wang Chuanbin, to the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Brig (retd) Said Azhar.

The relief goods consignment consists of 17 cases of dental instruments, 503 cases of medicines, 10 cases of surgical instruments and 3,000 kilograms of black tea.

The handing over ceremony took place at the Cabinet Division Warehouse in the Sindhi Muslim Housing Society here on Thursday morning.

Speaking on the occasion, the Chinese Ambassador Mr. Wang

Chuanbin said the relief consignment was a small token of the Chinese people and government's support for the valiant liberation struggle being waged by the Afghan people.

He said the Afghan people had a glorious history of resistance to foreign aggression and they would certainly succeed in freeing their homeland from the clutches of outside invading forces.

He praised the Pakistan people and the Government for their humanitarian assistance provided to the over three million Afghan refugees who have been forced to leave their homes and hearths and seek shelter here.

In his brief speech Brig. (retd) Said Azhar on behalf of the Pakistan Government thanked Mr.

Wang Chuanbin for the support extended to the Afghan refugees by the Chinese people and the Government.

The Pakistan Government, he continued, was doing its utmost to provide humanitarian aid to the Afghan refugees, who now number over three million, but due to the magnitude of the task it required help from other states and international agencies in looking after the refugees.

Mr. Wang Chuanbin, also said the Chinese people and Government would continue their aid and support to the Afghan refugees and make their due efforts in seeking a just and reasonable solution to the Afghan issue in accordance with the UN principles for safeguarding peace in Asia and the world.

CSO: 4600/551

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

PPP LEADER SENTENCED--Karachi, May 3--Mr Zafar Chatta, a leader of the defunct PPP, UK, has been sentenced to one-year R.I. and a fine of Rs 50,000 by a local military court, says a Press release. Mr Zafar was taken into custody on arrival at the airport from London with the declared intention of courting arrest in connection with the MRD movement, on Sept. 19, 1983. Mr Iqbal Hyder, an MRD leader, has said the punishment was extraordinarily harsh and uncalled for as Mr Zafar did not even court arrest formally. He demanded his unconditional release. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 4 May 84 p 3]

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